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THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF ALGORITHMIC LENDERS’ 
USE OF BIG DATA
MATTHEW ADAM BRUCKNER†
INTRODUCTION
Is Amazon.com racist, the headlines queried.1 As has been well-re-
ported, Amazon has been investing heavily in signing people up for its Prime 
service.2 Half of all American households have reportedly paid the $99 mem-
bership fee.3 In certain major metropolitan areas, Prime membership entitles 
customers to free same-day delivery in a bid “to eliminate one of the last 
advantages local retailers have over the e-commerce giant: instant gratifica-
tion.”4 But same-day delivery service wasn’t always available to every Prime 
member in those cities. A 2016 Bloomberg report found that Prime’s service 
area excluded large swaths of “predominantly black ZIP codes” in “six major 
same-day delivery cities.”5 Blacks in four cities—Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, 
and Washington D.C.—were only “half as likely to live in neighborhoods 
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hamton University. This article benefitted from the comments received in connection with presentations 
at SEALS’ annual meeting, Duquesne’s #FutureLaw2.0 conference, and Savannah’s Rise of the Autom-
atons conference. I would like to thank Ifeoma Ajunwa, Chris Bradley, Dennis D. Hirsch, Mikella Hurley, 
Anthony Joseph, Jeremy Kidd, Michelle Pistone, Linsay Sobers, and Andrew Tutt for their comments, 
ideas, and suggestions. Research assistance was provided by Anthony Cherry. As always, this article 
would not have been possible without the support and feedback of my wife, Morgan Hall. Research sup-
port was provided by Howard University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Bamzi Banchiri, Is Amazon Same-Day Delivery Service Racist?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Apr. 23, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2016/0423/Is-Amazon-same-day-de-
livery-service-racist [https://perma.cc/L2LD-2P8V]; Rafi Letzter, Amazon Just Showed Us That ‘Unbi-
ased’ Algorithms Can Be Inadvertently Racist, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 21, 2016, 4:50 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-algorithms-can-be-racist-2016-4 [http://perma.cc/MWP5-ZYFS].
2. See, e.g., Kandyce Jackson, Surfing While Black 24 (Jan. 26, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
3. See Aimee Picchi, Amazon Prime Day: Does It Make Sense to Sign Up for Prime?, CBS
MONEYWATCH (July 11, 2017, 1:51 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazon-prime-day-does-it-
make-sense-to-sign-up-for-prime/ [https://perma.cc/P5Y9-8M7J] (reporting the estimate of L2, a digital 
research firm).
4. David Ingold & Spencer Soper, Amazon Doesn’t Consider the Race of Its Customers. Should 
It?, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-amazon-same-day/ 
[https://perma.cc/7N9S-57FL].
5. Id.
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with access to Amazon same-day delivery as white residents.”6 And in NYC, 
same-day delivery included many surrounding suburbs but entirely excluded 
the predominantly minority borough of the “Bronx and some majority-black 
neighborhoods in Queens.”7
“Prime-lining” became a public relations nightmare for Amazon.8 The 
most striking example of “Prime-lining” was in Boston’s Roxbury neighbor-
hood—a primarily black area.9 Roxbury represented a donut hole in the 
city’s same-day delivery coverage area.10 In other words, Roxbury was en-
tirely surrounded by neighborhoods that were eligible for same-day delivery, 
but no one in Roxbury was eligible.11 Roxbury residents were ineligible de-
spite paying the same flat-rate Prime membership fee as every other city res-
ident.12
Amazon blamed its data-driven approach for “Prime-lining” and dis-
claimed any discriminatory intent.13 In apparent response to consumer pres-
sure, Amazon—which claims to have “a ‘radical sensitivity’ to any 
suggestion that neighborhoods are being singled out by race”—has since ex-
panded its same-day service to every zip code in every city where same-day 
service is offered.14 Amazon claims that it initially offered same-day service 
only in those neighborhoods that had a high pre-existing concentration of 
Prime members, rather than singling out predominantly-minority neighbor-
hoods for discriminatory treatment.15 But it’s not surprising that “a solely 
data-driven calculation that looks at numbers instead of people can reinforce 
long-entrenched inequality in access to retail services” given pre-existing in-
come and wealth gaps between races and segregated residential housing pat-
terns.16 Whether or not Amazon deliberately intended to discriminate against 
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Hat tip to Professor Adam Levitin for suggesting this phrase. See @AdamLevitin, TWITTER
(July 10, 2017, 10:20 AM), https://twitter.com/AdamLevitin/status/884462300316532736
[https://perma.cc/SJA6-6BEZ].
9. Ingold & Soper, supra note 4 (“Roxbury, with a population that’s about 59 percent black and 





14. Id. (noting the expansion in NYC, Boston and Chicago); see also Chris Moran, Amazon Now 
Expanding Same-Day Delivery to All ZIP Codes in 27 Cities, CONSUMERIST (May 6, 2016, 1:58 PM), 
https://consumerist.com/2016/05/06/amazon-now-expanding-same-day-delivery-to-all-zip-codes-in-27-
cities/ [https://perma.cc/9RDK-GAH4].
15. Ingold & Soper, supra note 4.
16. Id.
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minority and low-income customers, the firm’s initial failure to provide 
same-day delivery in every zip code had the same effect.17
The mainstream financial services industry has long had its own version 
of Prime-lining, excluding millions of Americans from taking advantage of 
their products and services because they lack a sufficient credit history to 
receive a credit score.18 Though this discrimination is legally sanctioned, it 
has pernicious effects.
In the financial services sector, innovative use of Big Data19 and credit-
worthiness algorithms20 purport to eliminate the discriminatory effects of 
credit-score-based determinations.21 Algorithmic lenders claim their innova-
tions allow them to make faster, cheaper, and more predictive credit deter-
minations, thus allowing them to lend to borrowers with lower credit 
17. Id. (noting that Amazon’s intentions did not “‘make much practical difference’ . . . [f]or people 
who live in black neighborhoods not served by Amazon”).
18. A “good” credit score is the primary factor in most traditional lending decisions. EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS, OPPORTUNITY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS
11 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/micro-
sites/ostp/2016_0504_data_discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JNR-LDNS]; EVA WOLKOWITZ &
SARAH PARKER, CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, BIG DATA, BIG POTENTIAL: HARNESSING DATA 
TECHNOLOGY FOR THE UNDERSERVED MARKET 18 (2015),
http://www.morganstanley.com/sustainableinvesting/pdf/Big_Data_Big_Potential.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9WY8-WZMG]. 
19. Big Data has been defined “as the collection and use of large data sets that can be broadly 
combined and distributed to identify patterns and create new data based on these insights—known as 
metavariables—to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of consumer finance products.” WOLKOWITZ 
& PARKER, supra note 18, at 3; Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a 
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014) (describing Big Data as
“the use of large data sets in data science and predictive analytics”); see also Eric Bank, How Marketplace 
Lenders Decide If You’re a Good Risk, CREDIBLE (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.credible.com/blog/mar-
ketplace-lenders-decide-good-risk [https://perma.cc/R737-7EQ4]; David F. Freeman, Jr. et al., FTC Re-
port on Big Data Could Foreshadow Big Compliance Issues: Implications for Unfair Lending, Credit 
Reporting, and Unfair and Deceptive Practices Compliance, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER (Jan. 
20, 2016), https://www.apks.com/en/perspectives/publications/2016/1/ftc-report-on-big-data 
[https://perma.cc/C5UY-M4L8] (suggesting that Big Data “can be loosely defined as the amassing and 
analysis of large consumer data sets and the incorporation of analytical results and conclusions into mar-
keting and lending decisions”); see infra text accompanying notes 32–33.
20. See Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 84 n.1 (2017) (“Algorithms 
are ‘procedure[s] for solving a given type of mathematical problem.’” (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 
175, 186 (1981))); see also DONALD D. SPENCER, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER 
TERMS 17 (5th ed. 1994) (An algorithm is “a mathematical or logical procedure for solving a problem. 
An algorithm is a recipe for finding the right answer to a difficult problem by breaking down the problem 
into simple steps.”); PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE 
LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 1 (2015) (“An algorithm is a sequence of instructions 
telling a computer what to do.”). 
21. Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, The Fintech Trilemma 31 (Vanderbilt Law Sch., Research 
Paper No. 17-46, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3054770## 
[https://perma.cc/458S-N4A8] (describing algorithms as being “central to the fintech economy.”).
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scores.22 Thus, algorithmic lenders23 often seek to set themselves apart from 
mainstream providers by arguing that they can make credit available to the 
“Credit Invisible.”24 The credit invisible includes those non-traditional bor-
rowers who are among the most adversely affected by the (legal) discrimi-
nation of traditional lenders.
Like many new technologies, algorithmic lenders’ use of Big Data 
holds great promise but may also be perilous. At the most basic level, Big 
Data is simply a toolkit for “creating, refining, and scaling financial solutions 
for consumers.”25 A company’s decision to use Big Data is “neither inher-
ently good nor bad.”26 Instead—as with any other tool—it can be used to 
help or to harm consumers. The Janus-faced nature of emerging financial 
technology (“fintech”) firms is particularly noteworthy, and lies at the heart 
of this Article.
Appropriate regulation will likely be key to delivering on Big Data’s 
promises in the financial services sector. All financial services companies 
22. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., BIG DATA: A BIG DISAPPOINTMENT FOR SCORING CONSUMER 
CREDIT RISK 12–13 (2014), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-big-data.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EG78-TLY8] [hereinafter, NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT]. But see Michael Gordon &
Vaughn Stewart, CFPB Insights on Alternative Data Use in Credit Scoring, LAW360 (May 3, 2017, 11:50 
AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/919094/cfpb-insights-on-alternative-data-use-in-credit-scoring 
[https://perma.cc/F2JB-2PUZ] (“While incorporating alternative data into the underwriting process could 
improve risk assessments, it may be difficult, at least initially, for lenders to evaluate the predictive power 
of new sources of data or new credit scores based on such data.”).
23. See infra text surrounding notes 83-86 (explaining the term algorithmic lenders by describing 
how one such lender operates).
24. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, DATA POINT: CREDIT INVISIBLES
6 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201505_cfpb_data-point-credit-invisibles.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U3DU-4L3B] (using the term “credit invisibles” to describe the 26 million Americans 
(or about 1 in 10) that do not have a credit history, and noting that another 19 million are unscorable 
because their histories are too scant (“thin”) or old). The reported number of unscorable Americans varies, 
with some estimating as many as 64 million people are affected. See also Mikella Hurley & Julius 
Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148, 174 (2016); Credit Invisi-
bility and Alternative Data: The Devil is in the Details, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. (June 
2015), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/credit_reports/ib-credit-invisible-june2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/74N9-3TG4] [hereinafter NCLC, Credit Invisibility] (noting that the CFPB has de-
scribed roughly 44 million Americans as being “credit invisible”); NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra
note 22, at 13 (suggesting that Big Data credit scoring models attempt to address shortcomings with 
traditional credit scoring, and that marketplace lenders purport to use their data mining and algorithmic 
scoring techniques to accurately assess the creditworthiness of “thin file” or “no file” borrowers).
25. Sarah Parker, 5 Things to Remember as the Big Data Debate Heats Up, MEDIUM (Feb. 2, 2016), 
https://medium.com/@CFSInnovation/5-things-to-remember-as-the-big-data-debate-heats-up-
fd964185e2f0 [https://perma.cc/MTR3-PU4W].
26. Id. (As a financial technology tool, Big Data “is neither inherently good nor bad because its 
value to providers and consumers depends on the quality of its application.”).
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are potentially subject to a significant amount of regulation. But while regu-
lators have paid attention to fintech’s development,27 regulations “have not 
kept pace with modern Big Data capabilities.”28 This presents challenges 
both for regulators and “for companies looking for firm legal guidelines as 
they build” their companies.29 Indeed, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) noted in a recent Request for Information that it needs to 
better understand these technologies to “encourage their responsible use and 
lower unnecessary barriers, including any unnecessary regulatory burden or 
uncertainty that impedes such use.”30 Impliedly, it will also seek to prevent 
fintech’s irresponsible use.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Part I provides a (very brief) 
overview of Big Data, machine learning/predicative analytics, and their use 
in making credit determinations. Part II discusses the promising and perilous 
nature of “algorithmic lending 2.0.” Its major promise is to bring the so-
called “credit invisibles” into the credit markets by using non-traditional 
credit measures. Its primary threat is the possibility that it will exacerbate 
financial services discrimination. Part III discusses several major pieces of 
the current regulatory regime, where it fails to adequately address the worst 
threats, and how we might improve oversight of algorithmic lenders.31
I. THE RISE OF BIG DATA IN CREDIT
A. What is Big Data?
“Big Data” lacks an agreed upon definition. In some ways, Big Data 
simply refers to any set of empirical facts. Others, however, have asserted 
that Big Data is like any other source of data plus “the 3Vs” (volume, variety, 
27. Numerous regulators have actively sought to obtain more information about algorithmic lenders 
and their use of Big Data. See, e.g., Request for Information Regarding Use of Alternative Data and 
Modeling Techniques in the Credit Process, 82 Fed. Reg. 11,183 (Feb. 21, 2017), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-02-21/pdf/2017-03361.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NWP-9F6D] 
[hereinafter CFPB RFI].
28. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 24 (discussing gaps and ambiguities in the current 
regulatory structures that may allow “data algorithms and machine-learning platforms” to use “data in an 
exploitive fashion to target underserved consumers with financial products that have poor quality or mod-
els designed to ensnare consumers in unhealthy relationships”); see also Jeremy Kidd, Fintech: Antidote 
to Rent-Seeking?, 93 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 165, 166 (2017) (discussing how financial technology innova-
tion will soon begin to outstrip the ability of regulators to keep pace). 
29. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 24.
30. CFPB RFI, supra note 27, at 11,183.
31. Namely, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the FTC’s UDAP power, the CFPB’s UDAAP 
power, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act; see infra Part III.
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and velocity).32 In other words, Big Data means there is a lot of data, of var-
ious types, that is capable of being rapidly processed.33 This Article is par-
ticularly concerned with Big Data’s use in the financial services sector by 
so-called marketplace lenders, which this article will generally call algorith-
mic lenders for reasons that will be made clear shortly.34
Companies often make sense of Big Data through the use of algorithms. 
An algorithm is a set of “instructions for how to solve a problem.”35 An al-
gorithm’s output is the solution to the problem the algorithm has been de-
signed to answer. For example, one of Netflix’s algorithms is designed to 
recommend movies to its users. Its recommendations are the algorithm’s out-
put. But it also needs inputs to make this decision. In this case, Netflix’s 
algorithm considers similarities between movies and television shows a user 
has already watched and ones that user might consider watching, such as: 
“Were they created at roughly the same time? Do they tend to get the same 
ratings?”36
Most algorithms are simple and “extremely straightforward.”37 Their
instructions are limited and the outcomes are easily determinable.38 For ex-
ample, a basic algorithm in Microsoft Excel can determine the largest num-
ber in a column of numbers. In Excel, the command is “=Max(Nx:Ny).” This 
algorithm searches the column of numbers “N” from row x through row y 
32. Dennis D. Hirsch, That’s Unfair! Or Is It? Big Data, Discrimination and the FTC’s Unfairness 
Authority, 103 U. KY. L. REV. 345, 349 (2014).
33. Margaret Rouse, 3Vs (Volume, Variety, and Velocity), WHATIS.COM, http://whatis.tech-
target.com/definition/3Vs [https://perma.cc/3UEW-JDHL].
34. Duane Pozza & Helen Wong, FinTech Forum: A Closer Look at Marketplace Lending, FTC 
(Aug. 3, 2016, 12:05 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2016/08/fintech-forum-
closer-look-marketplace-lending [https://perma.cc/8AJ2-QXGG] (“Marketplace lenders are typically 
online non-bank financial companies that leverage technology to reach potential borrowers, evaluate cre-
ditworthiness, and obtain credit sources for loans.”).
35. Jennifer Golbeck, How to Teach Yourself About Algorithms, SLATE (Feb. 9, 2016, 9:45 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/02/how_to_teach_yourself_about_algo-
rithms.single.html [https://perma.cc/T4RB-SABM]; see also Tutt, supra note 20, at 93 (discussing simple
algorithms like Google’s PageRank and Deep Blue’s chess playing algorithm and contrasting machine 
learning algorithms); Brummer & Yadav, supra note 21, at 31 (describing algorithms as “programmed 
computerized instructions”).
36. Tom Vanderbilt, The Science Behind the Netflix Algorithms That Decide What You’ll Watch 
Next (Aug. 7, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/08/qq_netflix-algorithm 
[https://perma.cc/EP3T-P2RS]; see also Golbeck, supra note 35 (discussing the inputs for a Google Maps 
algorithm).
37. Tutt, supra note 20, at 92.
38. A.M. Kuchling, Background: Algorithms, 50 EXAMPLES FOR TEACHING PYTHON, http://fif-
tyexamples.readthedocs.io/en/latest/algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/X2DN-F8JV].
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and returns the highest number in that column. This algorithm can be exe-
cuted with three instructions.39 An algorithm like this simple example “re-
sponds to specific inputs with specific outputs that the programmer 
anticipated in advance.”40 If an error occurs, the simplicity of this algorithm 
allows the programmer to review the instructions the algorithm followed “to 
find out why the error occurred and correct it.”41
Even some of the world’s most “impressive algorithms are basically not 
much more complicated than that.”42 For example, Google rose to promi-
nence because of its “PageRank Algorithm,” which is the primary tool by 
which Google orders search results.43 PageRank determines the order of 
search results by ranking each page based on “how many other webpages 
link to that page, and then it determines how much to value those links by 
determining how many pages link to those pages.”44 By distilling this pro-
cess down to a limited set of instructions that a computer repeatedly per-
forms, PageRank allowed Google to “rank the whole web, which was 
comprised of 26 million web pages at that time, ‘in a few hours on a medium 
size workstation.’”45
Both previous examples were of “dumb” algorithms, but a qualitatively 
different type of algorithm also exists. This new breed of “learning algo-
rithm” is not programmed by humans to complete a particular task. Instead, 
they are programmed to learn (on their own) how to perform a particular 
task.46 Stated differently, rather than building an algorithm to create a rank 
order of webpages, algorithms can be developed to figure out how to best 
rank order webpages. These learning algorithms are referred to by various 
names, including machine learners, predictive analytics, or artificial intelli-
gence.47 But whatever you call them, these learning algorithms are a pro-
found advance from simpler “dumb” algorithms.48
39. Id. (“1. Set max to O. 2. For each number x in the list L, compare it to max. If x is larger, set 
max to x. 3. max is now set to the largest number in the list.”).
40. Tutt, supra note 20, at 93.
41. Id.
42. Id.; see also Sishaar Rao, Demystifying the PageRank Algorithm, DEV (May 13, 2017), 
https://dev.to/sishaarrao/demystifying-the-pagerank-algorithm [http://perma.cc/Z3HV-53WE]. 
43. Tutt, supra note 20, at 93; Rao, supra note 42 (describing PageRank as “arguably the most 
widely-utilized and influential algorithm in our modern day”).
44. Id.; Rao, supra note 42 (describing the technical details of how PageRank works).
45. Tutt, supra note 20, at 93.
46. Id. at 94.
47. Id.; Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 88–89 (2014) (describing 
“machine learning” as “a subfield of computer science concerned with computer programs that are able 
to learn from experience and thus improve their performance over time”).
48. See Tutt, supra note 20, at 87, 95.
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Learning algorithms learn from and help make sense of Big Data.49 Big
Data involves aggregating large amounts of often-messy information, so 
learning algorithms can sort and analyze that information to provide novel 
insights and “solve problems in numerous disciplines and business arenas.”50
The paramount value of learning algorithms is “to detect patterns in data in 
order to automate complex tasks or make predictions.”51 For example, by 
analyzing their retail purchases, the New York Times reported that Target 
was able to accurately predict whether its female customers were pregnant.52
Reportedly, Target assigned shoppers a “pregnancy prediction” score by 
studying whether and when shoppers purchased 25 particular products.53 For 
example, a shopper that purchased “cocoa-butter lotion, a purse large enough 
to double as a diaper bag, zinc and magnesium supplements and a bright blue 
rug” might be judged 87 percent likely to be pregnant.54 Of course, to deter-
mine that these 25 products were key predictors of pregnancy, Target’s al-
gorithm must have analyzed thousands of products and likely millions of 
product combinations.55 Once identified, a shopper could be targeted with 
marketing materials and coupons to encourage her to buy more products at 
Target.56
Big Data is not a futuristic phenomenon. It is already in widespread use, 
pervading “all aspects of our daily lives.”57 For example, Google Search uses 
Big Data. Google Search collects and analyzes “hundreds of thousands of 
data points to arrive at the content and sequence of search results.”58 And
this is just one of Big Data’s many applications. Eventually “a group of en-
terprising companies realized that the same kind of processing [as Google 
Search uses] could be used in the field of consumer credit by developing new 
underwriting methods that went beyond FICO scores.”59 Since then the use 
49. “‘Big Data’ is lingo used to describe computations that sift immense data sets for valuable 
nuggets of information.” See Bank, supra note 19; see also supra text accompanying note 19.
50. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 19, at 96.
51. Surden, supra note 47, at 89.
52. Hirsch, supra note 32, at 350 (discussing this aspect of Target’s Big Data usage).




56. See Hirsch, supra note 32.
57. Bank, supra note 19; Sara Hajian et al., Algorithmic Bias: From Discrimination Discovery to 
Fairness-aware Data Mining, 22 ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA 
MINING 2125, 2125 (2016).
58. Bank, supra note 19.
59. Id. Most companies that use alternative data also continue to use traditional measures of credit-
worthiness. At least one company that claimed to have a “FICO-Free Zone” apparently secretly (and 
deceptively) continued to primarily rely on FICO scores for making credit determinations. See Thornton 
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of Big Data in the financial services sector has taken off, with a recent survey 
by the Economist estimating “that at least 74 percent of companies in the 
banking space have recently invested in new technologies to better leverage 
Big Data.”60
B. Big Data in Credit Scoring
Algorithmic lending has a long history.61 Although algorithmic lending 
is often thought of as being a twenty-first century phenomenon, it has been 
around at least since the introduction of the credit score by Fair, Isaac, and 
Company (“FICO”) in 1989.62 Although the exact details of the FICO score 
are a closely guarded secret, a FICO score is an algorithmic output.63 In other 
words, a FICO score is the output of a set of instructions on how to transform 
various inputs, such as a history of late payments, a person’s debt-to-credit-
limit ratio, and other elements, into a single numerical value. A FICO score 
is reportedly derived from fewer than fifty data points.64
In recent memory, the traditional path to obtaining a long-term, unse-
cured consumer loan required a prospective borrower to visit a bank’s phys-
ical offices. At the bank, the prospective borrower would discuss a possible 
McEnery, SoFi’s “FICO-Free Zone” Loan Process Was Maybe Actually Rather Full Of FICO,
DEALBREAKER (Sept. 14, 2017, 5:06 PM), http://dealbreaker.com/2017/09/sofis-fico-free-zone-loan-pro-
cess-was-actually-rather-full-of-fico/ [https://perma.cc/LX9Q-ZWTT] (“According to conversations 
with numerous former SoFi employees, the company’s ‘FICO-Free Zone’ loan product actually relied 
quite heavily on evaluating applicants by their FICO score.”).
60. Freeman, Jr. et al., supra note 19.
61. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 19, at 4 (describing early use of “Big Data” as beginning 
when credit bureaus gathered “tradeline information to assign consumer repayment risk; insurance com-
panies utilized applicant histories and demographics to set premiums; and car dealerships used infor-
mation on average vehicle life expectancy to calculate blue book values.” And claiming that “[t]he earliest 
uses of large data sets to inform financial product offerings did not differ greatly, in theory or aim, from 
how Big Data usage is conceived today.”).
62. Ann Carns, Is That Credit Score a FICO, or a FICO 8?, N.Y. TIMES: BUCKS (May 10, 2012, 
3:44 PM), https://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/is-that-credit-score-a-fico-or-a-fico-
8/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7E5T-6UAV].
63. How Credit History Impacts Your Credit Score, MYFICO.COM, http://www.myfico.com/credit-
education/whats-in-your-credit-score [https://perma.cc/N8KD-KJL4] (The most popular credit score, the 
FICO Score, is primarily composed of five factors: (i) payment history; (ii) amounts owed; (iii) length of 
credit history; (iv) new credit; and (v) types of credit used).
64. Introducing ZAML: Zest Automated Machine Learning, ZESTFINANCE, https://www.zest-
finance.com/zaml [https://perma.cc/3V5U-TGT9] (“Most traditional underwriting systems use fewer 
than 50 data points for credit decisions.”).
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loan with the bank’s loan officer65 and fill out the necessary paperwork.66
The bank would verify the prospective borrower’s income, assets and debts, 
and pull the prospective borrower’s credit score. The bank might also check 
the prospective borrower’s personal and professional references, and make a 
subjective determination of his or her appearance.67 If satisfied, the bank 
would lend to the prospective borrower. Because signature loans are unse-
cured and there is typically no co-signor, these loans are usually only made 
to people who are “very good credit risks or to people with whom the lender 
has a relationship.”68 As a result, prospective borrowers often fail to obtain 
the loan they seek.
Starting in 2006, a new type of lender appeared on the scene, threaten-
ing to disrupt the traditional method of obtaining a loan.69 These lenders are 
also algorithmic lenders, but have combined algorithmic lending with Big 
Data. Commonly referred to as “marketplace lenders” or “fintech” compa-
nies,70 these new algorithmic lenders are usually non-bank financial compa-
nies that operate mostly online and use financial technology to market 
themselves to prospective borrowers, evaluate borrower creditworthiness, 
65. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 24, at 155 (“Prior to the 1980s, most lending decisions were 
entrusted to individual loan officers and specialists who evaluated applicants on an individual basis. These 
underwriting processes were not only labor-intensive, but could be influenced by personal bias.”).
66. See, e.g., Lucy Lazarony, How to Apply for a Personal Loan, CREDIT.COM (Nov. 29, 2016), 
https://www.credit.com/loans/loan-articles/how-to-apply-for-personal-loan/ [https://perma.cc/CT7D-
CA59].
67. 4 Signature Loan Application Tips: What to Tell the Lender, LOAN.COM,
http://www.loan.com/personal-loans/4-signature-loan-application-tips-what-to-tell-the-lender.html 
[https://perma.cc/HZ5U-TN39] (advising prospective borrowers to “[b]e neat in appearance and make 
sure your documentation looks professional”).
68. Id.
69. See Kathryn F. Lazarev, CFPB Steps Up Scrutiny of FinTech Companies, GOODWIN:
LENDERLAW WATCH (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.lenderlawwatch.com/2016/03/10/cfpb-steps-up-scru-
tiny-of-fintech-companies/ [https://perma.cc/YD9E-J5WW] (“[M]arketplace lending is ‘a relatively new 
kind of online model.’”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN 
ONLINE MARKETPLACE LENDING 11 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/Oppor-
tunities_and_Challenges_in_Online_Marketplace_Lending_white_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KQG-
2549] [hereinafter TREASURY] (describing marketplace lenders as emerging in 2006); DELOITTE, A
TEMPORARY PHENOMENON? MARKETPLACE LENDING 4 (2016), https://www2.deloitte.com/con-
tent/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/financial-services/deloitte-uk-fs-marketplace-lending.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FV7B-TNN5] [hereinafter DELOITTE REPORT] (reporting that “[t]he world’s first [mar-
ketplace lender], Zopa, was founded in the UK in 2005. The first in the US, Prosper, was founded in 
2006”); Freeman, Jr. et al., supra note 19 (claiming that “Big Data is quickly becoming a fixture in the 
consumer lending industry”).
70. This is a portmanteau of abbreviations for the words “financial” and “technology.” See Chris-
topher G. Bradley, FinTech’s Double Edge, 93 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 61, 61 (2017).
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and to match prospective borrowers with sources of credit.71 Examples in-
clude SoFi, Lending Club, and Prosper.72 Another common thread with 
fintech lenders is the “use of non-traditional methods to determine credit-
worthiness.”73 In other words, these firms have increasingly embraced Big 
Data and learning algorithms, which allows them to exploit a market niche 
that traditional banks do not.
Each algorithmic lender has its own proprietary blend of data and ana-
lytics, but it remains possible to generalize somewhat about these compa-
nies.74 Marketplace lenders are widely touted as utilizing both traditional 
methods of underwriting, like FICO scores, and “highly sophisticated math-
ematical and machine learning processes in order to ascertain the credit wor-
thiness of a potential borrower.”75 In other words, version 2.0 algorithmic 
lenders use different inputs and a different process to evaluate prospective 
borrowers than traditional lenders, who typically focus primarily on a bor-
rower’s credit score.76 For example, “Lenddo makes use of more than 12,000 
71. Pozza & Wong, supra note 34; Glen P. Trudel et al., Treasury Releases White Paper on Online 
Marketplace Lending, BALLARD SPAHR (May 13, 2016), http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublica-
tions/legalalerts/2016-05-13-treasury-releases-white-paper-on-online-marketplace-lending.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/N5UV-9FJY] (citing Treasury’s definition for fintech and focusing on marketplace 
lender’s online presence and use of venture capital).
72. Lauren Gensler, The 10 Biggest Fintech Companies in America, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2017, 9:45 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurengensler/2017/08/08/biggest-us-fintech-compa-
nies/#7438479c59d8 [https://perma.cc/UYD4-KPRE].
73. Bank, supra note 19; see also Freeman, Jr. et al., supra note 19 (noting the “emerging array of 
new FinTech companies offering loan products or services based on the use of non-traditional methods 
for assessing creditworthiness, largely through the use of Big Data”).
74. Mercedes Tunstall & Andrew Caplan, When Marketplace Lending and Big Data Collide,
LAW360 (July 11, 2016, 12:18 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/815683/when-marketplace-lend-
ing-and-big-data-collide [https://perma.cc/YQ93-JRJV] (describing marketplace lenders as “looking be-
yond FICO scores to nontraditional data points—such as utility bills, rental payments, cell phone and 
cable bills, social media sites and online search histories, and other Big Data—so that they can better 
assess whether individuals who have little or no credit, or who have had poor credit behavior in the past, 
may be willing and able to pay off loans”).
75. See Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and Marketplace Lending, ALA. L. REV. (forth-
coming Spring 2018) (manuscript at 8) (on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review); see also U.S. PUB.
INTEREST RESEARCH GRP. & CTR. FOR DIG. DEMOCRACY, COMMENTS BY THE U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST 
RESEARCH GROUP (USPIRG) AND THE CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (CDD) ON “EXPANDING 
ACCESS TO CREDIT THROUGH ONLINE MARKETPLACE LENDING.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
RFI. [FR DOC. 2015–17644 BILLING CODE 4810–25–P4810-25-P DOCKET #RFI, TREAS-DO-2015-
0007-0001.] 5 (2015), https://www.democraticmedia.org/sites/default/files/field/pub-
lic/2015/uspirg_cdd_marketplacelendingrfi_final30sept2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VFW-VB7P] [here-
inafter USPIRG & CDD] (noting that fintech companies still use traditional measures of creditworthiness, 
such as FICO scores). 
76. USPIRG & CDD, supra note 75; see CFPB RFI, supra note 27, at 11,184 (defining “‘[t]radi-
tional [credit] data’” as data held by credit reporting agencies, such as “tradeline information (including 
certain loan or credit limit information, debt repayment history, and account status), and credit inquiries, 
as well as information from public records relating to civil judgments, tax liens, and bankruptcies. It also 
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data points gathered from social websites, such as Yahoo, Google, LinkedIn, 
Twitter and Facebook, to assess a consumer’s potential to pay off loans.”77
Other algorithmic lenders use different proxies for creditworthiness, such as 
“payment and sales history, online small business customer reviews,” repay-
ment history in various contexts (e.g., rent, utilities, including telephone and 
cable bills, and subprime credit), “educational history, professional licensure 
data, and personal property ownership data.”78
By incorporating Big Data, algorithmic lenders greatly expanded the 
inputs used to determine a prospective borrower’s creditworthiness. But at 
first, these new algorithmic lenders continued to use the same sort of “dumb” 
algorithms used by traditional lenders. In other words, the first generation of 
algorithmic lenders increased the volume of data inputs, but did not funda-
mentally change the process of evaluating a prospective borrower’s credit-
worthiness. That is, these algorithms were hand programmed. Human 
programmers had to decide which data elements were relevant to making 
credit determinations, and how much weight to give to each data element in 
making these determinations.
Algorithmic lenders—whose hand-programmed algorithms analyze the 
flood of additional data points—are similar to Deep Blue, the supercomputer 
that defeated the world’s greatest human chess player, Gary Kasparov.79
Deep Blue was able to think through millions more moves per second than 
Kasparov, but to defeat Kasparov, Deep Blue had to evaluate which possible 
move most improved its board position relative to other possible moves.80
To do so, “Deep Blue’s programmers came up with over eight thousand dif-
ferent parameters (known as ‘features’) that might be used to determine 
refers to data customarily provided by consumers as part of applications for credit, such as income or 
length of time in residence.”).
77. Bank, supra note 19; see also USPIRG & CDD, supra note 75 (noting that “marketplace lenders 
are using online data from sources such as Facebook, Google, . . . shopping trends on various websites,” 
and Yelp).
78. TREASURY, supra note 69, at 5; see also Bank, supra note 19; FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA:
A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? (2006), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/re-
ports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2XWW-ZEJK] [hereinafter FTC REPORT] (noting that “consumers who may not have 
access to traditional credit, but, for instance, have a professional license, pay rent on time, or own a car, 
may be given better access to credit than they otherwise would have”); WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra
note 18, at 12 (“LendUp incorporates borrowers’ repayment behavior.”).
79. Tutt, supra note 20, at 93.
80. Id. 
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whether a particular board position was good or bad.”81 Most of these fea-
tures (and the weight accorded to each feature) had to be devised by human 
programmers, programmed into Deep Blue and then repeatedly adjusted.82
C. Algorithmic Lending 2.0
But what this article refers to as “algorithmic lending 2.0”—lenders that 
have both expanded the volume of data inputs and turned to learning algo-
rithms to analyze that data—have already begun to emerge.83 A prime ex-
ample of this new breed of lender is ZestFinance. ZestFinance’s CEO “has 
proudly stated that ‘all data is credit data’ – that is, predictive analytics can 
take virtually any scrap of information about a person, analyse whether it 
corresponds to a characteristic of known-to-be-creditworthy people, and ex-
trapolate accordingly.”84 In other words, these emergent, version 2.0 algo-
rithmic lenders are expanding the world of credit data (and algorithmic 
inputs) even further than the original algorithmic lenders.85 Instead of limit-
ing their use of data to information that has a reasonably clear relationship 
with creditworthiness, they are embracing the unclear relationships between 
“Big Data” and creditworthiness. For example, “a consumer’s email ad-
dresses, brand of car, Facebook friends, educational background and college 
major, even whether he or she sends text messages in all capital letters or in 
lower case.”86 In short, version 2.0 algorithmic lenders are collecting every 
byte of data they can to feed into their credit-scoring algorithms.
In addition, unlike the dumb algorithms used by first-generation algo-
rithmic lenders, version 2.0 algorithmic lenders use so-called learning algo-
rithms to make credit decisions. As a result, these version 2.0 algorithmic 
lenders have not only changed the volume of inputs that their algorithms 
81. Id. at 94.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 86. It is these new version 2.0 algorithmic lenders that are the primary focus of this Article.
84. Frank Pasquale, Digital Star Chamber, AEON (Aug. 18, 2015), https://aeon.co/essays/judge-
jury-and-executioner-the-unaccountable-algorithm [https://perma.cc/AT2Y-FS3J].
85. In this regard, their intentions are not much different than traditional lenders. See WOLKOWITZ 
& PARKER, supra note 18, at 4 (“The earliest uses of large data sets to inform financial product offerings 
did not differ greatly, in theory or aim, from how Big Data usage is conceived today. Rather, its use was 
limited by rudimentary computing power and the hurdles of gathering and normalizing data from incom-
patible or non-digitized sources, both of which made the process relatively inefficient.”).
86. Gregory Roberts, Regulator Wades into Big Data Credit Swamp, BLOOMBERG LAW: BANKING
(Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.bna.com/regulator-wades-big-n57982086887/ [https://perma.cc/T8VP-
JPZR].
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must consider, but have also changed how those algorithms process that data. 
In doing so, they may have created a “black box” problem.87
Learning algorithms are fundamentally different than “dumb” algo-
rithms.88 As noted above, the first algorithmic lenders hand-crafted their al-
gorithms.89 Their goal was to design a set of instructions their credit-
algorithm could execute that would make better credit determinations than 
traditional FICO scores can.90 Designers of the new version of credit algo-
rithms have a different objective. They have to design a set of instructions 
that will create an algorithm that can learn how to make creditworthiness 
determinations on its own.91 Instead of deciding which features to prioritize 
and how much weight to give each feature, a learning algorithm is usually 
given a set of data on which to train itself.92 The algorithm (not the program-
mers) decides which features are relevant and how to weigh them.93 In other 
words, learning algorithms are often thought of as a black box, where pro-
grammers can see what went in (vast amounts of data) and what came out 
(e.g., a credit-determination) but now how or why the algorithm made any 
particular determination.94 As a result, if an error occurs with a learning al-
gorithm, a programmer usually cannot review the instructions the algorithm 
followed “to find out why the error occurred and correct it,” as they can with 
a dumb algorithm.95
To return to the Deep Blue analogy, Deep Blue was successfully pro-
grammed to be the best chess player in the world. By contrast, new chess-
87. See Bennie Mols, In Black Box Algorithms We Trust (or Do We?), ACM NEWS (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://cacm.acm.org/news/214618-in-black-box-algorithms-we-trust-or-do-we/fulltext (noting that most 
learning algorithms “operate like black boxes (devices that can be viewed in terms of their inputs and 
outputs, without any knowledge of their internal workings)”).
88. Tutt, supra note 20, at 85.
89. See supra text accompanying note 82; see also Surden, supra note 47, at 93 (“Most software is 
developed by a manual approach in which programmers explicitly specify a series of rules for a computer 
to follow that will produce some desired behavior.”).
90. Tutt, supra note 20, at 95–96.
91. Id. at 84 n.1.
92. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 24, at 181 (“ZestFinance may rely on statistical algorithms to 
automatically identify the most significant metavariables.”); Surden, supra note 47, at 93 (“[M]achine 
learning algorithms are able to automatically build accurate models of some phenomenon . . . without 
being explicitly programmed.”).
93. Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 678 
(2016) (“In particular, by exposing so-called ‘machine learning’ algorithms to examples of the cases of 
interest (previously identified instances of fraud, spam, default, and poor health), the algorithm ‘learns’ 
which related attributes or activities can serve as potential proxies for those qualities or outcomes of 
interest.”); see also Surden, supra note 47, at 93. This is not true in every case. In some cases, program-
mers may continue to manually curate some features of learning algorithms. 
94. See Mols, supra note 87.
95. Tutt, supra note 20, at 93.
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playing algorithms are teaching themselves to be the best chess players in 
the world.96 Algorithms can learn to solve problems by being exposed to 
“training data.”97 For credit-scoring, an algorithm may analyze a vast data 
set, comprised of all the company’s data about people who previously ap-
plied for credit, including whether these people received credit and, if so, 
whether they repaid their loans.98 The algorithm may then mine this data to 
identify variables that correlate with loan repayment and assign appropriate 
weights to these variables.99 If it’s been programmed well and the training 
data is good, the variables and weights the algorithm identifies should be 
useful for determining the creditworthiness of prospective borrowers as 
well.100 In other words, based on having reviewed a large enough sample of 
borrowers and the details known about them, including their repayment his-
tory, a learning algorithm can learn to predict the likelihood that future bor-
rowers will repay their loans.
II. THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ALGORITHMIC LENDING
A. The Promise
Algorithmic lending 2.0 may produce significant benefits relative to tra-
ditional lending. In its 2016 report on Big Data, the Obama White House 
declared, “Big [D]ata and associated technologies have enormous potential 
for positive impact in the United States.”101 There are at least three primary 
96. Id. at 98–99 (comparing Deep Blue to Giraffe, which has taught itself to play chess at a level 
that is comparable “to the best expert-designed counterparts in existence today, many of which have been 
fine tuned over the course of decades”); cf. Dawn Chan, The AI That Has Nothing to Learn from Humans,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/alphago-zero-the-
ai-that-taught-itself-go/543450/?utm_source=twb [https://perma.cc/VW2G-Z755] (describing a game-
playing AI, AlphaGo Zero, which “picked up Go from scratch, without studying any human games at all” 
and after “a mere three days” was playing so well that it was like AlphaGo Zero was from an “alternate 
dimension”).
97. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 93, at 680; see also Michael Feldman et al., Certifying and Re-
moving Disparate Impact, 21 ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING
259 (2015).
98. Cf. Feldman et al., supra note 97 (explaining how data mining works, as trying to find “the best 
set of decision rules among a large set of candidate rules”).
99. Cf. W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 431 (2017)
(using Google Image’s image recognition learning algorithm to explain the four-step process by which 
some algorithms are trained. First, the algorithm is shown “a set of known images (‘Here are 10,000 
pictures of ducks’).” Second, the algorithm “develops complex internal rules based on nonlinear pro-
cesses.” Third, the algorithm “tests those rules on a test set (‘Which of these are ducks?’).” And fourth, 
the algorithm adjusts its “internal rules based on the success of the test.” These steps are repeated ad
infinitum “until it can accurately and consistently classify the images.”).
100. Cf. id.
101. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 18, at 4; see also Hirsch, supra note 32, at 362. 
The new administration’s position is currently unknown.
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improvements that may result from using Big Data and learning algorithms 
in the financial services industry. First, using alternative data sources may
improve the predictive accuracy of creditworthiness determinations, allow-
ing algorithmic lenders to increase credit access for people who cannot bor-
row from traditional lenders.102 Second, algorithmic lending may be less 
expensive, thereby making credit more affordable and accessible. And fi-
nally, proponents of version 2.0 algorithmic lending claim that it can remove 
human bias from the credit-granting process. Each of these will be discussed 
in turn.
First, algorithmic lenders may increase credit access by using non-tra-
ditional lending criteria. A “good” credit score is the primary factor in most 
traditional lending decisions. Yet, “tens of millions of Americans . . . do not 
have enough information in their credit files to receive a traditional credit 
score or . . . have an undeservedly low score.”103 Without a traditional credit 
score, these so-called “credit invisibles”104 are unable to “access traditional 
forms of credit.”105 Minorities, youths, and low-income borrowers are more 
likely to be credit invisible than their white, older, and higher-income 
peers.106 Because algorithmic lenders use non-traditional measures of credit-
worthiness, they may be willing to lend to the “credit invisible.”107 Using
Big Data and machine learning in credit decisions also has the potential to 
create better predictions of which prospective borrowers will repay their 
loans.108
102. For example, Lenddo claims to increase approval rates by 15% while decreasing defaults by 
12%. Credit Scoring Solution, LENDDO,
https://www.lenddo.com/pdfs/Lenddo_FS_CreditScoring_201705.pdf [https://perma.cc/HAE2-4X6D].
103. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 18, at 12; WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note
18, at 8 (noting that the use of alternative data points allow lenders “to extend credit with more affordable 
rates and terms than small business owners could access using only their personal credit scores”). The 
reported number of unscorable Americans varies, with some estimating as many as 64 million people are 
affected. See supra text accompanying note 24.
104. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 24, at 6 (using the term “credit invisibles”).
105. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 24, at 155.
106. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 24, at 6; see also NCLC, Credit Invisibility,
supra note 24.
107. NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22.
108. Id. at 12; Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, Risk 
Pricing, and Alternative Information (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 17-17, 2017), 
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2017/wp17-
17.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/BH2J-GTAW] (presenting some of the first data on whether loans made 
using alternative data points perform better than loans using traditional FICO scores alone and concluding 
that they do).
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Accordingly, providing less expensive, and therefore more accessible, 
financial services to tens of millions of unbanked and underbanked consum-
ers is the most widely touted benefit of the new algorithmic lenders. For ex-
ample, ZestFinance has declared its intent “to make the extension of credit 
to consumers fairer and more inclusive, by expanding the measures used be-
yond the traditional ones that may work to the disadvantage of certain kinds 
of borrowers. Those people might include young adults, immigrants or men 
or women recently divorced.”109
Early reports on version 2.0 algorithmic lenders’ potential to increase 
credit access are very positive. Two studies found that algorithmic lending 
may truly democratize credit access by considering just a few additional data 
points. In the first study, the Policy and Economic Research Council re-
viewed more than four million credit files and “found that if both positive 
and negative utility and telecom payments were included, over 70 percent of 
the unscorable files would become scorable and 64 percent of the ‘thin files’ 
(files with very little other credit history) would see improved scores.”110
Another study—this one by LexisNexis—found similar results. It deter-
mined that nearly two-thirds of credit invisibles are low-risk and “likely to 
be good and profitable customers for lenders and credit card issuers.”111 Such 
dramatic changes are possible because many credit invisibles are often de-
nied credit because of “the absence of credit history rather than anything 
negative in their credit histories.”112 In other words, credit invisibles are gen-
erally either too young to have established a credit history, or have never 
been welcomed into the traditional banking system.113 As such, these 
changes would especially benefit the young, the low-income, and minori-
ties.114
109. Roberts, supra note 86; see also WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 9.
110. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 18, at 12.
111. JEFFREY FEINSTEIN, LEXISNEXIS RISK SOLUTIONS, ALTERNATIVE DATA AND FAIR LENDING 8
(2013), http://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/downloads/whitepaper/fair_lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8T3-
D2CT].
112. NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22, at 13 (Certain groups “have very little reported 
credit history—often because low-income consumers are less likely to access the types of financial ser-
vices that report to the traditional credit bureaus.”).
113. NCLC, Credit Invisibility, supra note 24.
114. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 18, at 12 (“The study also found that this change 
especially benefits low-income borrowers.”); NCLC, Credit Invisibility, supra note 24 (“African Ameri-
can, Hispanic, and low-income consumers are more likely” to be underserved in this regard.); see also 
Robert Bartlett et al., Consumer Lending Discrimination in the FinTech Era 3 (Nov. 2, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3063448 [https://perma.cc/U3VK-
QXZF] (finding that “African-American and Hispanic applicants are 2% more likely to be rejected for a 
mortgage than other applicants” and it is “small, independent mortgage originators, not large banks and 
not FinTech firms that impose greater discrimination”).
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In practice, there is some evidence that algorithmic lenders have in-
creased credit accessibility, as these studies suggest they should.115 For ex-
ample, in response to the Treasury Department’s Request for Information 
(RFI), some responders “suggested that online marketplace lending is ex-
panding access to credit in some segments by providing loans to certain bor-
rowers who might not otherwise have received capital.”116 Others have 
claimed that some newer entrants to the market have begun “to move down 
the credit spectrum and target sub-prime borrowers, . . . offering rates up to 
36 percent to borrowers with FICO scores as low as 580.”117 While 36 per-
cent is quite high for prime borrowers, it is far superior to the annualized 
interest rates available when a sub-prime borrower gets a loan from payday 
and pawn lenders.118 In addition, “[s]ome online marketplace lenders are ac-
cepting applicants without FICO scores or with short credit histories and 
making credit decisions based on the applicant’s college, school, and current 
income.”119
Evidence that algorithmic lenders are democratizing credit access re-
mains limited and anecdotal, however. And there is substantial evidence sug-
gesting that “the majority of borrowers of unsecured consumer credit using 
online marketplace lenders are prime borrowers refinancing existing debts, 
not receiving new credit.”120 In other words, debt consolidation is the pri-
mary use of marketplace loans so far.121 At a minimum, it’s fair to write that 
115. See, e.g., WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 16 (discussing various marketplace lenders 
and how their use of Big Data has allowed them to expand lending); see also Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra
note 108.
116. TREASURY, supra note 69, at 1 (claiming that these underserved borrowers include small busi-
ness owners who are receiving loans for their “general working capital and expansion needs.”).
117. Id.
118. See What is a Payday Loan?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consum-
erfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-payday-loan-en-1567/ [https://perma.cc/5FNZ-TMEF] (last updated 
June 2, 2017) (noting that payday loans typically have an effective annual interest rate of almost 400%, 
which is substantially higher than credit card interest rates).
119. TREASURY, supra note 69, at 12–13; see Christopher J. Willis, CFPB Provides Some Clarity 
on Alternative-Data Models Through No-Action Letter, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Sept. 20, 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2017/09/20/cfpb-provides-some-clarity-on-alternative-data-
models-through-no-action-letter/ [https://perma.cc/7PZS-CVQH] (noting that Upstart, a marketplace 
lender, uses “the identity of the college attended by the applicant” in its underwriting process).
120. TREASURY, supra note 69, at 13.
121. Id. at 1; see also RYAN NASH & ERIC BEARDSLEY, GOLDMAN SACHS, THE FUTURE OF 
FINANCE: THE RISE OF THE NEW SHADOW BANK 14 (2015) (reporting that “77.7% of loans originated on 
the Lending Club platform to date (as of 3Q14) have been for either debt refinancing (56.6%) or credit 
card payoff (21.1%)”). But see WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18; Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note
108, at 14.
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additional opportunities remain “to expand access to credit further into un-
derserved markets.”122
Second, algorithmic lending may be less expensive than traditional 
lending, which may make credit from algorithmic lenders more affordable 
and, therefore, more accessible.123 This new breed of lenders has witnessed 
tremendous growth, despite offering loan products that are very similar to 
those offered by traditional lenders, suggesting that existing loan models 
were not the most efficient model available.124 One of the clearest potential 
cost savings for algorithmic lenders is that a more accurate credit-underwrit-
ing model should decrease the incidence of loan defaults. For example, 
Lenddo, a version 2.0 algorithmic lender, claims to increase approval rates 
by 15% while decreasing defaults by 12%.125
And there are many other ways that version 2.0 algorithmic lenders may 
streamline the traditional lending process, reduce costs, and “improve oper-
ational efficiencies.”126 Automation can lower the cost of obtaining and an-
alyzing data for lenders, making credit underwriting faster.127 In theory, 
algorithmic lenders will need fewer employees in the future, though for now 
it may be that they’ve largely substituted engineers for loan officers. Algo-
rithmic lenders—which operate almost exclusively online—can also pass 
along “the cost savings of forgoing a physical brick and mortar structure.”128
Algorithmic lenders may have a lower cost structure because they “engage 
in more targeted advertising” than traditional lenders, often advertising 
through “online and social media advertising channels,” because they have 
122. TREASURY, supra note 69, at 1; see also NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22, at 13 
(suggesting that although algorithmic lenders may “extend access to credit to traditionally underserved 
populations” in the future, they largely appear not to have done so to date).
123. NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22, at 29.
124. NASH & BEARDSLEY, supra note 121 (“Surprisingly, the loan products offered by P2P lenders 
are similar to personal loans issued by banks”); see also TREASURY, supra note 69 (“The lower overhead 
costs associated with the use of automated platforms, online operations, and data-driven lending models 
has allowed online marketplace lenders to offer consumers competitive rates for debt consolidation and 
refinancing.”); see also Tunstall & Caplan, supra note 74 (“Further, low overhead costs compared to 
traditional financial institutions allow marketplace lenders to provide very competitive interest rates.”).
125. Credit Scoring Solution, LENDDO,
https://lenddo.com/pdfs/Lenddo_FS_CreditScoring_201705.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LVB-UJGL].
126. TREASURY, supra note 69, at 8.
127. CFPB RFI, supra note 27, at 11,184–85; TREASURY, supra note 69, at 1 (suggesting that expe-
dited credit assessments are cheaper); see also Lawrence D. Kaplan et al., Addressing ECOA Risk in 
Marketplace Lending, STAYCURRENT (Paul Hastings, Washington D.C.), Aug. 25, 2016, at 1
https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=802eea69-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded 
[https://perma.cc/BDC5-X6EF].
128. They can operate less expensively than traditional banks because their automated online loan 
processes require fewer man-hours of labor and they lack retail branches. See Kaplan et al., supra note
127; see also TREASURY, supra note 69, at 5.
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identified an underserved market niche.129 Better models should also reduce 
incidences of fraud.130 Finally, algorithmic lenders may have successfully 
“avoid[ed] dealing with many of the costly regulations” that traditional lend-
ers must endure.131
Whether algorithmic lenders enjoy cost advantages over traditional 
lenders and, if they do, whether these savings are passed along to consumers 
is a hotly contested question.132 But at least one report suggested that various 
firms were making more affordable loans because of their innovative use of 
new data sources. In a recent white paper, the Center for Financial Services 
Innovation reported that two algorithmic lenders—OnDeck and Kabbage—
were using “sales volume, customer reviews, and shipping histories” as 
proxies for the health of small businesses, which allowed these firms “to ex-
tend credit with more affordable rates and terms than small business owners
could access using only their personal credit scores.”133
129. See Kaplan et al., supra note 127, at 2–3.
130. TREASURY, supra note 69, at 19; see also Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 108.
131. NASH & BEARDSLEY, supra note 121; see also Linsay Sobers, Consumer Financial Protection 
Courts: A Review of The True Lender Doctrine 8 (Dec. 1, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the Chicago-Kent Law Review) (recognizing that bank-affiliated algorithmic lenders can avail them-
selves of a national bank’s preemption powers to avoid, among other things, interest rate caps set by state 
usury laws).
132. Compare TREASURY, supra note 69, at 20, 22–23 (noting that, in theory, fintech firms should 
get “efficiency benefits of automated data sources replacing paper sources” and that “co-branded or white 
label partnerships with banks or CDFIs can materially reduce customer acquisition costs for online mar-
ketplace lenders, thereby increasing the potential to serve more borrowers”), and id. at 19 (respondents 
to Treasury’s RFI contend that “consumers and small businesses benefit from lower costs, quicker turn-
around times, and greater convenience,” and that “new data sources are already expanding access to credit 
for small business borrowers and consumers.”), with NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22, at 30 
(finding “that high prices remained the norm”). 
Even if credit is being expanded, though, at this point it’s difficult to determine whether these 
are sound business decisions made possible by new technologies or whether they represent the grow-at-
all-costs mindset of many startup firms. See Matt Scully, SoFi’s Loan Losses Pile Up as Even Wealthy 
Borrowers Default, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 13, 2017, 2:46 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2017-03-13/sofi-s-loan-losses-pile-up-as-even-wealthy-borrowers-default [https://perma.cc/S3DJ-
LKTP] (describing how the “‘grow at all cost’ attitude” of some marketplace lenders appears to have 
resulted in bad credit risks and a mini industry downturn.). If the latter, these firms may be creating 
consumer surplus that will disappear once the industry matures and consolidates. Finally, if credit is being 
expanded and it’s a good business decision, it’s also not clear whether marketplace lenders are cherry-
picking so-called HENRYs (High Earner Not Rich Yet) or whether they are beginning to reduce “the
racial economic divide and wealth gap.” NCLC, Credit Invisibility, supra note 24. It’s well documented 
that “[c]ommunities of color have less income, and they have far fewer assets to cushion the blow of 
financial catastrophes such as job losses or sickness. These income and wealth disparities are caused by 
centuries of discrimination, which still have a huge impact to this day.” Id.
133. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 16.
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Finally, algorithmic lending’s proponents tout its ability to remove hu-
man bias from lending decisions.134 Big Data analytics purportedly allow for 
the objective truth to be revealed by eliminating “the subjectivity and cogni-
tive biases inherent in human decision-making.”135 As a result, “US regula-
tors have often encouraged businesses to use algorithms to make decisions. 
Regulators want to avoid the irrational or subconscious biases of human de-
cision-makers.”136 Among other boosters, a report by the Obama White 
House claimed that “[B]ig [D]ata provides opportunities for innovations that 
reduce discrimination and promote fairness and opportunity, including . . .
removing subconscious human bias.”137
Lending discrimination is a very important issue in which the federal 
government has historically been complicit.138 For example, “redlining”139
was a practice “invented by the Federal Housing Administration” that had 
the effect of depriving African Americans of “the ability to accumulate 
134. “With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves,” wrote Chris Anderson in Wired Mag-
azine. Chris Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete,
WIRED (June 23, 2008, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory/ [https://perma.cc/4F8G-
N29J]; cf. Kate Crawford, The Hidden Biases in Big Data, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 1, 2013), 
https://hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data [https://perma.cc/5KUH-3X3U] (describing An-
derson’s view as “‘data fundamentalism,’ the notion that correlation always indicates causation, and that 
massive data sets and predictive analytics always reflect objective truth”); see also TREASURY, supra note 
69, at 5 (claiming that, in consumer credit markets, Big Data appears to remove human decision-making 
from the credit-granting process).
135. KEVIN PETRASIC ET AL., WHITE & CASE, ALGORITHMS AND BIAS: WHAT LENDERS NEED TO 
KNOW 2 (2017), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/algo-
rithm-risk-thought-leadership.pdf [https://perma.cc/EWH6-RLQR].
136. Pasquale, supra note 84 (contesting the claim that algorithms are bias-free, arguing instead that 
“human decision-makers devised the algorithms, inflected the data, and influenced its analysis”); see also 
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions,
89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 (2014) (noting that “[a]dvocates applaud the removal of human beings and their 
flaws from the assessment process,” but arguing that bias remains “[b]ecause human beings program 
predictive algorithms, their biases and values are embedded into the software’s instructions”).
137. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 18, at 4.
138. Historically, racial discrimination was both overt and government sanctioned. See Jordan Pear-
son, How Big Data Could Discriminate, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 16, 2014, 6:00 AM) (citing 
GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS 24–33 (1998)), https://mother-
board.vice.com/en_us/article/d73x7v/why-the-federal-trade-commission-thinks-big-data-could-be-dis-
criminatory [https://perma.cc/R8T7-DA5V] (describing “how Federal Housing Administration loan 
policies explicitly favored whites up until 1948 (though they were allowed by the Supreme Court to con-
tinue after), effectively locking black families out of lucrative housing markets for generations”).
139. “Redlining is the practice of denying or limiting financial services to certain neighborhoods 
based on racial or ethnic composition without regard to the residents’ qualifications or creditworthiness.” 
Rachelle Alexandre, Discriminatory Lending Practices Against African Americans 4 (Nov. 28, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review); SHIRLEY SAGAWA & ELI SEGAL,
COMMON INTEREST, COMMON GOOD: CREATING VALUE THROUGH BUSINESS AND SOCIAL SECTOR 
PARTNERSHIPS 30 (2000).
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wealth through homeownership.”140 Although overt racial discrimination, 
such as redlining, is now illegal, many insidious forms of discrimination ap-
pear alive and well. In addition, the effects of scores of years of state-spon-
sored and state-tolerated racial discrimination continue to have a pernicious 
effect on the financial health of many minorities.141 As a result, “[c]redit re-
ports and scores reflect stunning racial disparities.”142
While racial discrimination is now illegal in many contexts, it contin-
ues.143 For example, in 2015, “Hudson City Savings Bank, New Jersey’s 
largest savings bank,” paid a $33 million fine (while admitting no wrongdo-
ing) “for redlining, the practice in which banks choke off lending to minority 
communities.”144 Hudson allegedly “focused on marketing mortgages in pre-
dominantly white sections of suburban New Jersey and Long Island,” instead 
of in black and Hispanic communities.145 As a result, “[i]n 2014, Hudson 
approved 1,886 mortgages in the market that includes New Jersey and sec-
tions of New York and Connecticut, federal mortgage data show. Only 25 of 
those loans went to black borrowers.”146 Similar examples abound.147
In short, eliminating human bias that fosters discriminatory lending is 
an important goal. And Americans ought to welcome any technology that 
can democratize credit access and begin to reverse some of the most perni-
cious effects of the centuries of racism that have left various minorities, but 
140. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PAST IMPERFECT: HOW CREDIT SCORES AND OTHER ANALYTICS 
“BAKE IN” AND PERPETUATE PAST DISCRIMINATION 2, (2016), http://www.nclc.org/im-
ages/pdf/credit_discrimination/Past_Imperfect050616.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8ED-WTDR] [hereinafter 
NCLC, PAST IMPERFECT]; see also B. Alicia Johnson, Credit Discrimination, the Continuing Cycle, and 
Possible Solutions 5 (Nov. 30, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Re-
view).
141. By no means were African Americans the only group affected by redlining. See, e.g., Emily 
Badger, How Redlining’s Racist Effects Lasted for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/upshot/how-redlinings-racist-effects-lasted-for-dec-
ades.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/XKH6-X64M] (discussing Brooklyn’s Bedford-Stuyvesant neighbor-
hood—a predominantly black neighborhood—and noting that although approximately 30 percent of the 
population was not black they were nonetheless affected by redlining).
142. NCLC, PAST IMPERFECT, supra note 140, at 1–2 (explaining that these disparities exist, in large 
part because of “centuries of discrimination, redlining, and exclusion”).
143. See, e.g., Nathan Bomey, JPMorgan Pays $55M to Settle Mortgage Discrimination Lawsuit,
USA TODAY (Jan. 18, 2017, 7:18 PM), www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/01/18/us-accuses-jpmor-
gan-mortgage-discrimination-lawsuit/96710486/ [https://perma.cc/GJ5U-JB7W]; Rachel Swarns, Biased 
Lending Evolves, and Blacks Face Trouble Getting Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/nyregion/hudson-city-bank-settlement.html?_r=0. 
[https://perma.cc/536J-PE6C]; Bartlett et al., supra note 114 (finding both decreased access to mortgage 
loans for certain racial minorities and increased prices).
144. Swarns, supra note 143.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Bartlett et al., supra note 114.
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particularly African Americans, in poor financial health. But, without inten-
tionally pursuing these ends, algorithmic lenders’ use of machine-learning 
and Big Data is unlikely to achieve these worthwhile goals.148 Some sort of 
intervention is almost surely needed. Even worse than failing to remove bias, 
algorithmic lending may provide a veneer of objectivity to credit determina-
tions, systemizing discrimination in hidden ways.149
B. The Perils
Although algorithmic lenders and their Big Data usage may offer sub-
stantial benefits to consumers, it may also be perilous. As a result, the chal-
lenge will be, as the Obama White House declared in its Big Data report, “to 
support growth in the beneficial use of [B]ig [D]ata while ensuring that it 
does not create unintended discriminatory consequences.”150 To support al-
gorithmic lending’s promise while stifling its threats, we must first explore 
those potential threats. As the Obama White House report noted, there is one 
concern that stands above all others: illegal discrimination.
While Big Data’s supporters claim that algorithmic decision-making re-
duces the incidence of human bias, there are several notable examples of 
human bias bleeding into algorithmic decision-making processes. Thus, “if 
these technologies are not implemented with care, they can . . . perpetuate, 
exacerbate, or mask harmful discrimination.”151 For example, a British hos-
pital, St. George’s, created an algorithm to help decide which students to 
admit for medical training at the hospital.152 This algorithm was a learning 
148. “It is often assumed that Big Data techniques are unbiased because of the scale of the data and 
because the techniques are implemented through algorithmic systems. However, it is a mistake to assume 
they are objective simply because they are data-driven.” EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 18,
at 6; see also Hajian et al., supra note 57 (pointing out that discriminatory algorithms show “ads for high-
income jobs to men more often than to women” and “ads for arrest records are significantly more likely 
to show up on searches for distinctively black names.”); infra text accompanying notes 163–167.
149. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 136, at 13. But see Anderson, supra note 134.
150. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 18, at 4; see also Hirsch, supra note 32, at 346.
151. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 18, at 5. Big Data may be used to purposefully 
discriminate against low-income, minority and underserved populations using “legally protected charac-
teristics in hiring, housing, lending, and other processes” as proxies for variables that could not be used. 
See Odia Kagan et al., Use of Big Data May Violate Federal Consumer Protection Laws, FTC Report 
Warns, BALLARD SPAHR (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/le-
galalerts/2016-01-13-use-of-big-data-may-violate-consumer-protection-laws-ftc-report-warns.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/5ZYH-TQBX] [hereinafter FTC Report Warns] (reporting that the FTC has expressed 
concern about “how [B]ig [D]ata could be used in the future to the disadvantage of low-income and 
underserved communities and adversely affect consumers” (citation omitted)); Barocas & Selbst, supra 
note 93, at 674 (noting that “because the mechanism through which data mining may disadvantage pro-
tected classes is less obvious in cases of unintentional discrimination, the injustice may be harder to iden-
tify and address”).
152. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 93, at 682.
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algorithm, trained using a data set derived from some of the school’s past 
admissions decisions.153 As it turned out, St. George’s prior admissions de-
cisions had been systematically unfavorable to equally qualified racial mi-
norities and women.154 And because St. George’s used those past admissions 
decisions to teach its algorithm how to make future decisions, its admissions 
algorithm replicated the biases inherent in its training data.155 Essentially, 
automating a process based on discriminatory past practices had transformed 
past prejudice or bias (whether conscious or unconscious) into a formalized 
rule that systematically and negatively affected the prospects of all future 
applicants.156
Moreover, a learning algorithm has numerous opportunities to pick up 
human biases and therefore create discriminatory outcomes.157 First, the al-
gorithm can be given biased training data, as noted in the example from St. 
George’s Hospital above.158 Second, an algorithm could be biased when it is 
initially programmed. Programming bias is particularly likely to occur when 
the problem to be solved does not “rely on extant, binary categories.”159 In
such cases, programmers need to “translate some amorphous problem into a 
question that can be expressed in more formal terms that computers can 
parse.”160 And it is “[t]hrough this necessarily subjective process of transla-
tion,” that programmers may “systematically disadvantage protected clas-





157. PETRASIC ET AL., supra note 135 (“In an algorithmic system, there are three main sources of 
bias that could lead to biased or discriminatory outcomes: input, training and programming.”); see also 
Pasquale, supra note 84 (“Algorithms will never offer an escape from society.”); Citron & Pasquale, 
supra note 136, at 4 (arguing that a programmer’s “biases and values are embedded into . . . predictive 
algorithms”); Hajian et al., supra note 57 (noting that the potential for “algorithmic bias exists even when 
there is no discrimination intention [sic] in the developer of the algorithm”).
158. PETRASIC ET AL., supra note 135. Feeding an algorithm biased training data may be inadvertent 
or intentional. If the latter, it may be more appropriately considered programming bias. See Barocas & 
Selbst, supra note 93, at 680 (discussing how “biased training data leads to discriminatory models”);
Crawford, supra note 134 (discussing how Boston used the technology in smartphones to “passively de-
tect potholes,” and noting that lower levels of “smartphone penetration” in poorer parts of town resulted 
in the perception that there were fewer potholes in those neighborhoods, a form of input bias).
159. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 93; see also PETRASIC ET AL., supra note 135 (noting that pro-
gramming bias can “occur in the original design or when a smart algorithm is allowed to learn and modify 
itself through successive contacts with human users, the assimilation of existing data, or the introduction 
of new data”); Brummer & Yadav, supra note 21, at 34 (noting that “sophisticated algorithms operate in 
accordance with programming that is based on a set of assumptions and parameters, statistical models 
and decision-making processes – any of which may be wrong, inaccurate or insufficiently precise”). 
160. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 93.
161. Id.
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Finally, algorithms can develop biases in ways that we don’t quite un-
derstand.162 For example, a 2012 study conducted by Professor Latanya 
Sweeney found that the algorithms powering Google’s AdWords advertising 
system may be expressing racial bias by more frequently associating black-
identifying names with suggestions that a person has been arrested than it 
does with white-identifying names.163 This is true “regardless of whether the 
company placing the ad reveals an arrest record associated with the name.”164
Professor Sweeney’s study concluded that Google is “25 percent more 
likely” to suggest that people with black-identifying names are potential 
criminals than people with white-identifying names.165 Ultimately, the study 
simply noted that racial bias exists in this space, but was unable to explain 
why.166
Of course, the problem of using inaccurate or biased data to justify de-
cisions that harm minorities or other protected populations is not a new 
one.167 And algorithmic lenders need only do better than traditional lenders 
to make a difference.168 But some are concerned that the imprimatur pro-
vided by using a supposedly bias-free algorithm will “make it more difficult 
for the company using such data to identify the source of discriminatory ef-
fects and address it.”169 Moreover, the notion that math somehow represents 
objective truth and that numbers don’t lie can obfuscate “bias problems that 
negatively impact people’s lives.”170 In reality, algorithmic lending has the 
potential to disparately impact certain groups (and expose lenders to fair 
lending violations).171
Not only is it false “that data doesn’t lie—and therefore, that algorithms 
that analyze the data can’t be prejudiced,” but Big Data can perpetuate, or 
162. The persistent shrouding of the credit-scoring process makes it difficult to understand how 
scores are compiled, let alone whether those scores are appropriate. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 136,
at 10–11 (discussing efforts by FICO and others to keep their processes a secret).
163. Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, ACM QUEUE, Apr. 2, 2013, at 11 
(using a list of the top “whitest- and blackest-identifying girls’ and boys’ names”).
164. Id. at 4.
165. Id. at 8, 13.
166. Id. at 14.
167. See FTC REPORT, supra note 78, at 8.
168. Early evidence suggests that algorithmic lending 2.0 may be more predictive than traditional 
credit underwriting models. See Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 108.
169. See FTC REPORT, supra note 78, at 8.
170. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 18, at 10; see also Danielle Keats Citron, Tech-
nological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1249 (2008) (suggesting a “hearing officer’s tendency 
to presume a computer system’s infallibility”).
171. TREASURY, supra note 69, at 1.
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even exacerbate, “existing systems of racism, discrimination, and inequal-
ity.”172 Similarly, once biases are embedded in the code (or the algorithm 
learns to be biased based on its training data), it may draw inferences that 
appear objective but are actually biased.173 For example, an algorithm may 
draw a negative correlation between creditworthiness and occupations that 
involve migratory work (like fruit harvesting) or low-paying service jobs.174
While this correlation may not reflect intentional bias, it can have a discrim-
inatory (and illegal) effect on certain protected groups if, for example, a ma-
jority of fruit harvesters or service workers are racial minorities or otherwise 
members of a protected category of persons.175
As noted above, algorithmic lenders’ use of Big Data promises to pre-
dict the creditworthiness of those who were previously credit invisible. But 
the reliance on certain data points may discriminate unfairly. For example, 
version 2.0 algorithmic lenders often use data from a prospective borrower’s 
social media accounts, such as the creditworthiness of the prospective bor-
rower’s peer group, when making credit determinations. But, as noted above, 
“African Americans tend to have lower incomes[, less wealth,] and lower 
credit scores than white Americans. If a borrower’s application or pricing is 
based, in part, on the creditworthiness of her social circles, that data can lead 
to [unlawful] discrimination against minorities compared to white borrowers 
with the same credit scores.”176
Similarly, Big Data can be used to compare a prospective borrower’s 
shopping patterns to those of previous borrowers. But this can also have a 
discriminatory effect. In a commonly noted and related example, “American 
Express lowered a customer’s credit limit from $10,800 to $3,800, not based 
on his payment history with the company, but because ‘[o]ther customers 
who [had] used their card at establishments where [he had] recently shopped 
172. Michael Brennan, Can Computers Be Racist? Big Data, Inequality, and Discrimination, FORD 
FOUND.: EQUALS CHANGE BLOG (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-change-
blog/posts/can-computers-be-racist-big-data-inequality-and-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/A2EW-
BRPH].
173. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 136, at 14 (for example, “[a]lgorithms may place a low score on 
occupations like migratory work or low-paying service jobs. This correlation may have no discriminatory 
intent, but if a majority of those workers are racial minorities, such variables can unfairly impact con-
sumers’ loan application outcomes.”).
174. Id.
175. Id. 
176. Letter from Lauren Saunders, Assistant Dir., NCLC, Laura Temel, Policy Advisor, U.S. Dep’t 
of the Treasury (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/rulemaking/treasury-marketplace-
loan-comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ATS-3RXC].  
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[had] a poor repayment history with American Express.’”177 Historic dis-
crimination has contributed to residential housing segregation and to the ra-
cial wealth and income gaps. Assessing a prospective borrower based on his 
or her social network or shopping patterns is likely to simply institutionalize 
and legitimize differential (and likely worse) treatment of poor and minority 
borrowers.178
Even an algorithm that has been specifically constructed to avoid con-
sidering a prospective borrower’s race (because race is a protected category 
under most fair lending laws) might nevertheless discriminate against a pro-
spective borrower by using proxies for race.179 Some simple proxies for race 
include zip code, surname, and college attendance data.180 As minorities 
have historically tended to have lower incomes and lower credit scores, an 
algorithm trained on past lending decisions might learn to consistently reject 
borrowers using proxies for race, such as having graduated from a histori-
cally black college or university.181
There is no simple way to avoid the problem that version 2.0 algorith-
mic lenders may find correlations in their data that have a discriminatory 
impact on members of protected categories. Without training data, algo-
rithms generally cannot learn to make decisions. But the legacies of discrim-
ination pervade American society and infect consumer credit data. Thus, we 
should assume that, absent affirmative interventions, version 2.0 credit algo-
rithms will perpetuate bias.182
177. NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22, at 27–28.
178. “Big Data can lead to decision-making based on the actions of others with whom consumers 
share some characteristics.” FTC REPORT, supra note 78, at 9 (citing FTC v. CompuCredit Corp., No. 
1.08-cv-1976-BBM-RGV, 2008 WL 8762850 (N.D. Ga. June 10, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/cases/2008/12/081219compucreditstiporder.pdf [http://perma.cc/UX4R-PDWE])
(noting that one credit card company settled FTC allegations that it failed to disclose its practice of rating 
consumers as having a greater credit risk because they used their cards to pay for marriage counseling, 
therapy, or tire-repair services, based on its experiences with other consumers and their repayment histo-
ries”); see also Citron & Pasquale, supra note 136, at 4.
179. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, USING PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION TO 
PROXY FOR UNIDENTIFIED RACE AND ETHNICITY 4 (2014), files.consum-
erfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_report_proxy-methodology.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KQS-AHPC] (noting 
the prohibitions found in the ECOA and Regulation B).
180. See generally id. at 3 (describing how “geography- and surname-based information” can be 
combined “into a single proxy probability for race and ethnicity” using the BISG method.). See also
Barocas & Selbst, supra note 93, at 682 (discussing the use of attendance at HBCUs as a proxy for race).
181. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 93, at 682. Nevertheless, the CFPB recently issued the startup 
lender, Upstart, a “no action letter” for Upstart’s use of alternative data points, including college attend-
ance data. See Willis, supra note 119.
182. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 93, at 671.
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III. THE REGULATORY REGIME AND ITS ISSUES
The examples in this Article are meant to highlight the many reasons to 
be concerned about algorithmic lenders’ use of Big Data, particularly the 
concerns about its potentially discriminatory effects on prospective borrow-
ers. The United States has numerous anti-discrimination laws designed to 
cover an array of market practices, “from loan disclosures to credit reporting 
to privacy practices to debt collection.”183 This section will discuss some of 
these laws, and evaluate the likelihood that they are effective in reducing the 
threats and promoting the promise of algorithmic lending 2.0. It also identi-
fies some areas where additional steps are needed to prevent version 2.0 al-
gorithmic lenders from unlawfully discriminating against members of 
protected classes.184
Many consumer protection agencies have been paying close attention 
to version 2.0 algorithmic lenders, with several issuing targeted warnings.185
For example, former “CFPB director, Richard Cordray, warned that ‘[a]ll 
lenders, from startups to large banks, must follow consumer protection 
laws.’”186 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), has been notably active. It 
recently held a series of forums on marketplace lending, where Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) issues were 
repeatedly raised.187 In this way and others, the FTC has signaled its inten-
tion to regulate Big Data practices that could violate the consumer protection 
laws it is charged with enforcing.188
183. Numerous state and federal statutes and regulations affect consumer lending in the United 
States, including, among others, the Fair Housing Act, the FTC Act, the Truth in Lending Act, the Elec-
tronic Fund Transfer Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act. See Pozza & Wong, supra note 34 (detailing many other regulations that 
apply and providing some detail on each, including lending disclosures and advertising, use of online 
data, preauthorizing electronic payments, and servicing and debt collection); see also Freeman, Jr. et al., 
supra note 19.
184. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 93 at 692.
185. The Federal Trade Commission, CFPB, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Treas-
ury Department have all been studying the issue and trying to get a handle on the promise and risks of 
algorithmic lending. See CFPB RFI, supra note 27, at 11,185–86; TREASURY, supra note 69, at 1; Angela 
M. Herrboldt, Marketplace Lending, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Washington, 
D.C.), Winter 2015, at 12, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/in-
sights/siwin15/si_winter2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GF2-MUCN]; FTC REPORT, supra note 78.
186. Lazarev, supra note 69.
187. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2015) (ECOA); 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2015) (FCRA); see also Tunstall & 
Caplan, supra note 74.
188. John K. Higgins, FTC Issues Regulatory Warning on Big Data Use, E-COM. TIMES (Jan. 20, 
2016), http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/83004.html [https://perma.cc/GLT2-VTBR] (highlight-
ing a report in which the FTC indicated that it “‘will continue to monitor areas where Big Data practices’ 
could violate those laws ‘and will bring enforcement actions where appropriate.’”); Barbara S. Mishkin, 
FTC Sends 2016 ECOA Report to CFPB, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Feb. 13, 2017) 
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In the three subsections that follow, this Article will focus on the appli-
cation of four laws (the ECOA, the FCRA, the FTC’s Unfair and Deceptive 
Acts or Practices (UDAP) authority and the CFPB’s Unfair, Deceptive, and 
Abusive Acts or Practices (UDAAP) authority) to algorithmic lending 2.0, 
and consider whether each of these statutes helps protect against the most 
perilous aspects of algorithmic lending and whether they help algorithmic 
lenders fulfill their promise. The ECOA and the FCRA are two of the prin-
cipal statutes governing consumer loans.189 These statutes and related regu-
lations aim to increase transparency in the credit-granting process “by 
providing an applicant with a reason when a loan is not approved.”190 They 
also seek to prevent discrimination against certain categories of people.191
Both the FTC and the CFPB have authority to enforce these statutes. In ad-
dition, the FTC and CFPB both have the power to prohibit unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices.192 Finally, the CFPB alone may also prohibit abusive 
acts or practices.193
A. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
The ECOA’s goal is to increase credit availability for “all creditworthy 
applicants” without regard to certain protected statuses.194 Thus, preventing 
discriminatory lending practices is the primary aim of the ECOA. Among 
other things, the ECOA makes it illegal for a lender, including its affiliates 
and assignees, to discriminate against prospective borrowers “on the basis of 
https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2017/02/13/ftc-sends-2016-ecoa-report-to-cfpb/ [https://perma.cc/43ZR-
XGNT] (noting that the FTC report “discussed the potential applicability of various [consumer protec-
tion] laws, including the ECOA, to Big Data practices and provided a list of ‘questions for legal compli-
ance’ for companies to consider in light of these laws.”); Letter from Malini Mithal, Acting Assoc. Dir., 
Div. of Fin. Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Patrice Ficklin, Assistant Dir., Fair Lending & Equal Op-
portunity, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/re-
ports/federal-trade-commission-enforcement-activities-under-equal-credit-opportunity-act-regulation-
b/p154802_ftc_letter_to_cfpb_re_ecoa.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL34-RWXK] (same).
189. Roberts, supra note 86; NCLC, Credit Invisibility, supra note 24 (“‘Big Data’ used for credit, 
employment, insurance, or other purposes is covered by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and providers 
must comply with that Act. If Big Data is used for credit, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act applies. 
Lenders must ensure that the use of Big Data does not create a disparate impact for protected groups.”).
190. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 24.
191. Id. 
192. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2011); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
CFPB BULL. 2013-07, PROHIBITION OF UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES IN THE 
COLLECTION OF CONSUMER DEBTS (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201307_cfpb_bulle-
tin_unfair-deceptive-abusive-practices.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN8W-9T2S]; Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1002(12), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. § 5481).
193. 2 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
194. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.1(b) (2016).
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race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided 
the applicant has the capacity to contract).”195 The ECOA’s prohibitions ap-
ply broadly to all aspects of credit transactions, including advertising, credit 
determinations, the “approval process, and servicing and collection activi-
ties.”196
The ECOA is likely to apply to algorithmic lenders197—whether they 
use a direct- or bank-affiliated lending model—because they are all likely 
“creditors” as defined under the ECOA.198 The ECOA defines “creditors” as 
“any person who regularly extends, renews, or continues credit; any person 
who regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or continuation of credit; 
or any assignee of an original creditor who participates in the decision to 
extend, renew, or continue credit.”199 Direct lenders regularly extend credit 
themselves and are clearly covered by the ECOA.200 Given the breadth of 
their involvement in credit issuances, the ECOA also applies to most bank-
affiliated lenders because, at a minimum, they regularly arrange for their 
partner banks to extend credit. One exception would be if a bank-affiliated 
195. The ECOA prohibits discrimination by “creditors,” which are defined as “any person who reg-
ularly extends, renews, or continues credit; any person who regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, 
or continuation of credit; or any assignee of an original creditor who participates in the decision to extend, 
renew, or continue credit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e) (2015). The ECOA also prohibits discrimination “be-
cause all or part of the applicant’s income derives from any public assistance program; or (3) because the 
applicant has in good faith exercised any right under this chapter.” § 1691(a); see also Paul Slattery, 
Square Pegs in a Round Hole: SEC Regulation of Online Peer-to-Peer Lending and the CFPB Alterna-
tive, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 268 (2013); Roberts, supra note 86; Tunstall & Caplan, supra note 74;
PETER MANBECK ET AL., CHAPMAN & CUTLER, THE REGULATION OF MARKETPLACE LENDING: A
SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES 75 (2017), https://www.chapman.com/media/publica-
tion/744_Chapman_Regulation_Marketplace_Lending_0317.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ4F-Q4DB].
196. MANBECK ET AL., supra note 195; see also Roberts, supra note 86.
197. There are two primary models used by algorithmic lenders “to originate and fund loans”: direct 
lending and bank-affiliated lending. Glen P. Trudel et al., FDIC Highlights Marketplace Lending Risks 
for Bank Partners, BALLARD SPAHR (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/le-
galalerts/2016-02-05-fdic-highlights-marketplace-lending-risks-for-bank-partners.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6A6B-HH7W]. Direct lenders are usually non-banks that lend “funds directly to the 
borrower and issues notes to investors who provide such funds.” Id. Direct lenders generally act quite 
like traditional lenders in that they solicit borrowers, make loans and hold those loans on their own bal-
ance sheets. See TREASURY, supra note 69, at 6 (direct lenders often “hold loans on their balance sheets” 
instead of selling these loans to outside investors). Bank-affiliated lenders are usually a non-bank com-
pany that has partnered with a nationally-chartered bank. The bank originates the loans, and sells each
loan to its affiliate algorithmic lender who “sells notes to investors who agreed to fund [each] loan.” 
Trudel et al., supra note 197; see also Sobers, supra note 131, at 3 (citing Herrboldt, supra note 185, at 
14) (contrasting “bank-affiliated” algorithmic lenders with direct lenders); Odinet, supra note 75, at 11; 
TREASURY, supra note 69, at 5; Kaplan et al., supra note 127.
198. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 24, at 191–92 (explaining why the ECOA likely applies to mar-
ketplace lenders, unless they merely solicit prospective borrowers); see also Slattery, supra note 195, at 
268–69.
199. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e) (2015).
200. MANBECK ET AL., supra note 195, at 76 n.168.
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lender merely solicits prospective borrowers but is not otherwise involved in 
the credit transaction. Such lenders would not be covered by the ECOA.201
Also worth noting is that, in some jurisdictions, courts have found that bank-
affiliated lenders are the “true lender” rather than the assignee of their bank 
partner, at least for some regulatory purposes.202 If the true lender doctrine 
were to apply for purposes of ECOA coverage, bank-affiliated lenders would 
be indistinguishable from direct lenders.
Assuming the ECOA applies, there are generally two ways to prove an 
ECOA violation.203 The first, disparate treatment, bans intentionally differ-
ent treatment of potential borrowers.204 “Disparate treatment ranges from 
overt discrimination to more subtle differences in treatment.”205 An example 
of overt discriminatory treatment would be if a lender had a policy of offer-
ing more favorable credit terms to older applicants.206 This policy violates 
the prohibition on discrimination based on age.207 Similarly, overt discrimi-
natory treatment would exist if an algorithmic lender steered “applicants to 
products with a higher-price, higher-risk or more onerous terms on a prohib-
ited basis instead of the applicants’ needs.”208
The second way to prove an ECOA violation, disparate impact, prohib-
its using apparently neutral criteria that nevertheless result in disparate treat-
ment of prospective borrowers without a “legitimate business need.”209
Disparate impact means that the policy or practice “has a disproportionately 
201. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 24; see also Slattery, supra note 195, at 268–69.
202. See Sobers, supra note 131.
203. See Kaplan et al., supra note 127 (“Lenders are prohibited both from engaging in disparate 
treatment of applicants, which occurs if a lender directly or overtly discriminates on a prohibited basis, 
and, more challengingly, lenders are prohibited from acting in a way that causes a disparate impact.”).
204. Roberts, supra note 86.
205. Side by Side: A Guide to Fair Lending, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/re-
sources/side/results.html [https://perma.cc/XRR3-W3FA] (last updated July 28, 1999).
206. AM. BANKERS ASSOC., ABA TOOLBOX ON FAIR LENDING, TOOL 2: FAIR LENDING LEGAL 
FOUNDATIONS 7 (2012), https://www.aba.com/aba/toolbox/FairLending/FairLending_Tool2r.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2GSA-VPE2] [hereinafter ABA TOOLBOX] (“Or, if a lender has a specific underwriting 
policy that treats married joint applicants differently than unmarried joint applicants, that policy would
constitute overt discrimination on the basis of marital status.”).
207. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a); see also ABA TOOLBOX, supra note 206.
208. ABA TOOLBOX, supra note 206, at 8; see also Freeman, Jr. et al., supra note 19 (noting the 
potential for ECOA liability “should a company decide to lend only to women or only to married people” 
or any other protected class).
209. See Kaplan et al., supra note 127; see also Roberts, supra note 86; Freeman, Jr. et al., supra
note 19 (“[A] lender may find itself facing regulatory actions and/or civil litigation if the metrics it uses 
to make credit decisions have a disproportionate impact on a protected group, even if no discriminatory 
intent is present.”); Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,267 (Apr. 15, 1994), 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-3860.html [https://perma.cc/96AZ-77T3] (“Evidence
of ‘disparate impact,’ [exists] when a lender applies a practice uniformly to all applicants but the practice 
has a discriminatory effect on a prohibited basis and is not justified by business necessity.”).
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negative impact on qualified applicants from a prohibited basis group.”210
For example, a lender may adopt the seemingly neutral policy of not making 
mortgage loans of less than $500,000 to any prospective borrower.211 If es-
tablishing a minimum loan amount can be shown “to disproportionately ex-
clude potential minority applicants from consideration because of their 
income levels or the value of the houses in certain areas in which they live, 
the lender will be required to justify the ‘business necessity’ for the policy,” 
or be found to have disparately impacted such borrowers.212 Since “the very 
point of data mining is to provide a rational basis upon which to distinguish 
between individuals and to reliably confer to the individual the qualities pos-
sessed by those who seem statistically similar,” algorithmic lenders ought to 
be seriously concerned about potential disparate impact claims under the 
ECOA.213
But some commentators have argued that algorithmic lenders are less 
likely to face successful disparate impact or disparate treatment claims than 
traditional lenders for several reasons.214 Algorithms are meant to reduce 
“the influence of individual loan-officer discretion on lending decisions,” 
thus decreasing the likelihood that a loan officer’s individual bias will result 
210. ABA TOOLBOX, supra note 206, at 9; see also Kaplan et al., supra note 127 (“A lender may 
unknowingly cause a disparate impact if it engages in a facially neutral practice, but that practice has an 
adverse impact on members of a protected class and the lender is unable to demonstrate that the practice 
is justified by a legitimate business need and cannot reasonably be achieved by other less discriminatory 
means.”).
211. Side by Side: A Guide to Fair Lending, supra note 205.
212. See id.; see also FTC REPORT, supra note 78, at iii; Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 24, at 194 
(describing the test for establishing a prima facie disparate impact claim as requiring “three things: 1) a 
specifically identifiable practice or policy; 2) a statistically significant disparity in treatment between a 
protected group and other groups; and, 3) a causal link between the disparity and the practice or policy”); 
Roberts, supra note 86 (providing two additional examples: “For example, if research showed that grad-
uates of certain selective universities made for better credit risks, and a lender based its decisions on that 
criterion, the process might result in a disparate impact if the admissions procedures for the universities 
discriminated against a protected group. A lender could run into disparate-impact problems if it evaluated 
applicants on whether they shopped online for wedding anniversary gifts, even if that correlated with 
creditworthiness, because that behavior could be a proxy for marital status.”).
213. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 93, at 677.
214. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 24, at 193. It’s not even certain that disparate-impact claims are 
available under the ECOA, as the statutory text “makes no mention of disparate impact analysis.” Id. 
Although the Supreme Court has allowed disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act, it has not 
considered the availability of such claims under the ECOA. Id. (noting that the “circuit courts have con-
sistently held that such claims are available”). Finally, in Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., the Court 
suggested that where a lender can cite “multiple factors” for its decision, it may be more difficult to 
establish a disparate impact violation. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523–24 (2015); see also Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 24, at 193–94.
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in liability for an algorithmic lender.215 In addition, Mikella Hurley and Jul-
ius Adebayo claim that lenders with a taste for discrimination could engage 
in subterfuge by singling out members of protected classes using “facially-
neutral proxy variables in its scoring model as stand-ins for characteristics 
like race” instead of adopting facially discriminatory policies.216 While the 
latter assertion is likely true, it’s not clear that the former is. It’s not clear 
that programmers are less biased than loan-officers and so increasing the in-
fluence of the former to decrease the influence of the latter seems unlikely 
to make an appreciable difference in the success of disparate treatment 
claims.217
1. The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate Impact Liability
Version 2.0 algorithmic lenders’ use of Big Data and machine learning
may allow them to more successfully defend against disparate impact liabil-
ity than traditional lenders. Despite otherwise unlawful discrimination, lend-
ers may avoid disparate impact liability if they can establish that such 
discrimination has a valid purpose and is not an “artificial, arbitrary, and un-
necessary” barrier to obtaining a loan.218 To avoid disparate impact liability,
the lender must prove there is a “‘demonstrable relationship between’ the 
challenged policy and ‘creditworthiness.’”219 Maximizing profit is not a 
valid purpose.220 Hurley & Adebayo argue that algorithmic lenders are likely
to successfully establish a business necessity defense to disparate impact li-
ability by arguing that their credit algorithms—even if discriminatory—
serve a valid purpose because they accurately predict the chances a borrower 
215. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 24, at 192–93; accord Bartlett et al., supra note 114 (finding 
less bias by algorithmic lenders than by small banks).
216. Id. at 191; see also GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 2–5 (1957).
217. But see Bartlett et al., supra note 114. However, it may be easier to hide discrimination beneath 
the veneer of objectivity offered by algorithmic lending 2.0. For example, Synchrony Bank recently en-
tered into a consent decree to settle claims that it had violated the ECOA by “discriminat[ing] on the basis 
of national origin by excluding Borrowers who had ‘Spanish preferred’ indicators on their accounts or 
Borrowers with mailing addresses in Puerto Rico . . . from two direct-mail debt-repayment programs.” 
See Consent Order, United States v. Synchrony Bank, No. 2:14-cv-00454-DS (D. Utah June 27, 2014). 
Synchrony might have been able to more effectively discriminate against certain “Spanish preferred” 
borrowers by using neutral proxies for national origin programmed into a credit algorithm instead of the 
more obvious proxies that it did use.
218. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2524 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 91 S. Ct. 
849, 853 (1971)); see also Ballard J. Yelton, The Direct Impact of Disparate Impact Claims on Banks,
20 N.C. BANKING INST. 167, 179 (2016).
219. NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22, at 29 (citing 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 supp. I § 202.6(a)-
2 (2013) (Official Staff Interpretations)).
220. Id.
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will repay them.221 As such, charging certain borrowers higher rates of inter-
est (or declining to lend to some borrowers all together) is not an “artificial, 
arbitrary, and unnecessary” barrier but a business necessity.
By contrast, the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) has argued 
that algorithmic lenders will have a more difficult time than traditional lend-
ers establishing the necessary “demonstrable relationship.”222 This is be-
cause traditional models use data elements that have “an understandable 
connection between timely repayment of past obligations and the likelihood 
of timely repayment of future obligations.”223 However, the correlations “be-
tween web searches, IP address, or social media posts and the likelihood of 
repayment” will be harder to establish because “there has been no definitive 
understandable reason provided as to why those data points are a good meas-
ure of creditworthiness.”224 While this is currently true, one imagines that 
time will either demonstrate some relationship between the data used by al-
gorithmic lenders and creditworthiness, or that algorithmic lenders will go 
out of business because they’ll have made a heap of bad loans. In the interim, 
regulators are giving algorithmic lenders the space to tinker with their busi-
ness models and consider alternative data points without imposing ECOA 
liability.225
Both arguments depend on whether algorithmic lending models are pre-
dictive of creditworthiness. Although time will tell, this Author believes that 
it’s likely that algorithmic credit-underwriting is, or will soon be, superior to 
traditional credit-underwriting. Thus, algorithmic lenders will be able to es-
tablish the demonstrable relationship between their algorithms and credit-
worthiness. But that doesn’t mean Hurley & Adebayo have it quite right 
either.
Assuming that a lender can establish that their models are predictive of 
a borrower’s likelihood of repayment, it may still face liability. The lender 
may still have liability under a disparate impact theory of liability if the 
plaintiff can establish that there is a less discriminatory alternative. And lend-
ers that do not cleanse their data of its proxies for protected classes may risk 
such liability, as there are now techniques available that can, in some in-
stances, “repair” data sets to eliminate discriminatory impact without losing 
221. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 24, at 194 (“In order to prove ‘business necessity,’ the defendant 
need not show that the challenged policy or practice was indispensable to its objective, but only that the 
policy was ‘related’ to its objective or business goals.”). See supra text accompanying note 108.
222. NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22, at 29.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See Willis, supra note 181.
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substantial predictive accuracy.226 If plaintiffs bringing a disparate impact 
claim under the ECOA can demonstrate that a less discriminatory but equally 
effective model existed, defendant’s business necessity defense must fail.227
Whether a lender’s failure to repair its data will establish disparate im-
pact liability, it’s also important that regulators do not hold algorithmic lend-
ers to a higher standard than traditional lenders.228 Whereas version 2.0 
algorithmic lenders are trying to innovate, most traditional lenders use credit-
scoring models that are generally considered outdated and therefore gener-
ally do not represent the least discriminatory options available to them. For 
example, although it’s widely known that FICO scores exist, it’s less well-
known that FICO has nine different versions of its credit scoring system. 
Each new version reflects the most up-to-date and sophisticated credit scor-
ing model then in existence. For example, in the ninth iteration, FICO largely 
disregards the existence of medical debt when evaluating a borrower’s cre-
ditworthiness because FICO “recognizes that medical debt is not a good pre-
dictor of other forms of non-repayment.”229 But “most mainstream providers 
have not switched to using the new FICO model.”230 As a result, consumers 
saddled with medical debt continue to struggle to obtain credit.231 Arguably,
therefore, most mainstream lenders are using credit scoring models that are 
known to include elements that are not predictive of creditworthiness and do 
226. See Feldman et al., supra note 97 (arguing that the legitimate business purpose defense is not 
satisfied where such credit data can be repaired); see also Hajian et al., supra note 57 (discussing how to 
reduce the incidence of discrimination in data); accord Cynthia Dwork et al., Fairness Through Aware-
ness, 3 INNOVATIONS THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCI. 214 (2012); Bryce W. Goodman, A Step Towards 
Accountable Algorithms?: Algorithmic Discrimination and the European Union General Data Protec-
tion, 29 CONF. ON NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING SYS. (2016).
227. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 24, at 194–95 (“[I]f the defendant shows business necessity, the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to offer a policy or practice that would be equally effective in meeting 
the defendant’s goals, but that would not produce a disparate impact.”).
228. To be clear, plaintiffs seeking to establish a lender’s disparate-impact liability have a substantial 
burden to carry. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2523–24 (2015). Plaintiffs must marshal empirical evidence showing a statistically significant dis-
parity in treatment, establish that the disparity is caused by the lender (instead of related to a pre-existing 
disparity), and demonstrate a causal relationship between the disparity and the challenged practice. See,
e.g., City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 171 F. Supp. 3d. 1314, 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (holding that 
“Inclusive Communities requires that an FHA disparate impact complaint (1) show statistically-imbal-
anced lending patterns which adversely impact a minority group; (2) identify a facially-neutral policy 
used by Defendants; (3) allege that such policy was ‘artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary;’ and (4) provide 
factual allegations that meet the ‘robust causality requirement’ linking the challenged neutral policy to a 
specific adverse racial or ethnic disparity” (citing Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–24)).
229. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 19.
230. Id. (“In fact, the majority of lenders nationwide are still using FICO Score 4, and only a relative 
handful has gotten so far as FICO Score 8, released six years ago.”)
231. Id.
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so without sanction. Thus, it seems hard to argue against allowing algorith-
mic lenders to use new models that reflect up-to-date thinking and that are 
(hopefully) more predictive but are, as of yet, unproven.
To promote the promise of algorithmic lending, regulators must allow 
algorithmic lenders the space to innovate. If regulators and courts subject 
algorithmic lenders to disparate impact liability because they cannot prove 
their models are predictive of creditworthiness, these lenders will not be able 
to operate. And unless algorithmic lenders are allowed to use these new mod-
els and prove they are predictive of creditworthiness, it’s unclear how the 
financial services sector will ever innovate. Thus, so long as the FTC and 
CFPB continue to give algorithmic lenders the freedom to iterate and inno-
vate, they may appropriately encourage the promise of algorithmic lending.
2. Adverse Impact Notices
An important objective of the ECOA is to increase transparency in lend-
ing decisions. The ECOA’s drafters sought to increase transparency by,
among other things, requiring that lenders provide so-called adverse impact 
notices. These notices are meant to explain to applicants why they’ve been 
denied credit.232 Regulation B, which implements the FCRA and the ECOA, 
provides a template adverse action notice that requires, among other things, 
“that applicants who are turned down for a loan in the U.S. must be given a 
standard notice that states a legal, nondiscriminatory reason for the rejection 
along with the sources of information used.”233 The idea is rejected appli-
232. Adverse action notices must be sent within 30 days of the “creditor’s approval of, counteroffer 
to, or adverse action” on a borrower’s credit application. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.9(a)(1)(i) (2017). An “adverse 
action” is any “refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested 
in an application unless the creditor makes a counteroffer (to grant credit in a different amount or on other 
terms) and the applicant uses or expressly accepts the credit offered.” 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(c)(1)(i).
233. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 11; see also 12 C.F.R. § 1002.9(b)(2).
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cants that receive an “adverse action notice” will be better positioned to un-
derstand potential issues in their credit files, dispute inaccurate infor-
mation,234 and work to improve their credit scores.235
Version 2.0 algorithmic lenders may have difficulty providing adverse 
impact notices because of opacity issues some believe are inherent to learn-
ing algorithms.236 To provide adverse impact notices, lenders must take cer-
tain steps, including maintaining adequate records in order to document for 
borrowers the reasons why they were rejected.237 Lenders must also “be able 
to document and justify their models, including the factors considered, the 
weight applied to those factors, and the credit cutoff determination, in order 
to demonstrate the empirical backing and legitimate business need of their 
specific model.”238 Some commentators have suggested that it is virtually 
impossible for version 2.0 algorithmic lenders to explain their denials be-
cause learning algorithms are essentially a “black box.”239 This likely over-
states the case, in at least some instances.
234. The FCRA also requires that data relied on be complete, which would be another challenge for 
algorithmic lenders. NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22, at 23–24 (noting that, “[d]epending on 
the data source, many pieces of information will be snapshots in time. For example, a lender wanting to 
analyze patterns of online shopping may do so by using cookies embedded in the consumer’s web-
browser. However, those cookies will not include items that were returned or that were purchased as 
gifts.”). Technological solutions, such as using inexpensive RFID tracking devices to help merge con-
sumers’ online and offline lives, may make this less of a problem in the future than it may currently be. 
See e.g., Monique Serbu, Why RFID Is the Best Way to Track Your Merchandise, BUSINESS.ORG (July 
19, 2013) http://www.businessbee.com/resources/profitability/why-rfid-is-the-best-way-to-track-your-
merchandise/ [https://perma.cc/Z4RV-6KZB] (describing RFID tracking); Barbara Thao, Is the ‘RFID 
Retail Revolution’ Finally Here? A Macy’s Case Study, FORBES (May 15, 2017) 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/barbarathau/2017/05/15/is-the-rfid-retail-revolution-finally-here-a-macys-
case-study/#79904d1a3294 [https://perma.cc/5AM6-N5X9] (explaining how Macy’s uses RFID technol-
ogy). 
235. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 11 (“This minimum requirement for transparency of 
data sourcing is crucial, allowing applicants to understand what elements of their profile proved damaging 
and to dispute the accuracy of this information with the original data source if the information appears 
incorrect. However, many loan applicants who are successful never learn which details impact their loan 
decision—either positively or negatively.”).
236. Freeman, Jr. et al., supra note 19 (noting that algorithmic lenders may find compliance difficult 
(or even impossible) because of “the complexity and opaqueness that can be introduced by Big Data 
analytical techniques”).
237. See id. (“Regulation B (the implementing regulation of ECOA) requires that lenders maintain 
records regarding the criteria used to select recipients of prescreened solicitations.”).
238. See Kaplan et al., supra note 127; see also Slattery, supra note 195, at 268 (“A creditor must 
notify the applicant of any action on the application. If the creditor takes an ‘adverse action’ on the ap-
plication—including a refusal to grant credit—the creditor must provide written justification. The state-
ment must give specific reasons for the adverse action. Under ECOA Regulation B, indications that the 
action was made “on the creditor’s internal standards or policies or that the applicant . . . failed to achieve 
a qualifying score on the creditor’s credit scoring system are insufficient.”).
239. Roberts, supra note 86 (noting that the notice requirement is likely difficult to comply with for 
algorithmic lenders); Frank Pasquale, Bittersweet Mysteries of Machine Learning (A Provocation),
LONDON SCH. ECONS. POLITICAL SCI.: MEDIA POLICY PROJECT BLOG (Feb. 5, 2016), 
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In practice, algorithmic lenders may be able to provide sufficient ad-
verse impact notices through technological innovation produced by, among 
other things, market incentives to reduce opacity in their credit determina-
tions. It is definitely more challenging for version 2.0 algorithmic lenders “to 
isolate what the reason, or the top three reasons, were that resulted in the 
decision to decline the applicant.”240 At a minimum, using “thousands of data 
points in generating a credit decision increases the complexity of such deci-
sions, adding to the reliance of borrowers on scoring platform companies to 
decipher the key drivers behind the results of their algorithms.”241 But that’s 
at least somewhat true of traditional lenders too, whose credit-scoring algo-
rithms are considered proprietary. And at least one company, ZestFinance, 
claims to have designed a learning algorithm that surmounts traditional opac-
ity issues and unblacks the box of its technology.242 It claims that even with 
complex machine learning “models that may use up to thousands of varia-
bles, [ZestFinance] identifies the primary factors driving applicants’ 
scores.”243 ZestFinance claims that its technology “produces simple, easy-
to-read adverse action reasons.”244 If Zest can truly produce “intuitive and 
comprehensible” explanations for its lending decisions, then consumers may 
be able to learn how to protect themselves, which is the purpose of these 
adverse action notices.245 And, more importantly, designing an appropriate 
set of incentives might “nudge [other] companies developing machine-learn-
ing algorithms into incorporating explainability from the outset.”246
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2016/02/05/bittersweet-mysteries-of-machine-learning-a-prov-
ocation/ [https://perma.cc/KWD9-JMMR] [hereinafter Pasquale, Mysteries] (noting that the CEO of Af-
firm, an algorithmic lender, recently admitted that he cannot explain why the company makes particular 
loans and therefore presumably cannot explain when it denies people credit either).
240. Roberts, supra note 86 (By contrast, this requirement—enacted at a time when traditional credit 
measures were the only measures in use—is generally thought to be relatively easy to comply with for 
traditional lenders.).
241. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 11.
242. Cf. id. at 6 (discussing how “[s]ome innovative companies are going beyond legally required 
minimums of disclosure by transparently conveying the types of data sources they use or explaining to 
consumers how their behavior can drive profile improvements that lead to better rates and offers. Well-
informed consumers who are empowered to report erroneous data or shift behaviors to improve their 
financial standing can enhance data quality and reduce risk for providers while securing better outcomes 
for themselves.”).






246. Tutt, supra note 20, at 109.
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Finally, it’s possible that algorithmic lenders may have trouble comply-
ing with the adverse action requirement in law, but not in spirit. The purpose 
of the law is to improve credit access and to empower consumers. Some al-
gorithmic lenders are working to do just that. For example, fintech compa-
nies such as LendUp and Elevate, work with borrowers to improve their 
credit indicators.247 Although these lenders may not know every variable that 
will ultimately matter to their credit-scoring algorithms, they are aware of 
the major drivers. For example, both of these algorithmic lenders view prior 
on-time payments “and participation in financial education modules” to be 
indicative of low-risk borrowers.248 Others, such as Lenddo, are able to ex-
plain to prospective borrowers about the unconventional types of data that 
feed into its credit-scoring algorithms, such as social media data.249 This
knowledge may empower prospective borrowers to change how they share 
information on social media and improve their chances of securing a loan.
In sum, Regulation B’s adverse impact notice requirement may be dif-
ficult for version 2.0 algorithmic lenders to comply with, diminishing their 
ability to compete with traditional lenders. Optimistically, these require-
ments may push algorithmic lenders to create more transparent credit-scor-
ing algorithms, like ZestFinance claims to have done. But it may be that a 
flexibly-interpreted requirement would help promote the promise of algo-
rithmic lending while avoiding its most perilous aspects. As a result, this is 
an area ripe for improvement, but not one that needs to be totally revamped.
B. UDA(A)P
The FTC and the CFPB (together, the UDA(A)P Regulators) are em-
powered to police algorithmic lenders using their UDAP and UDAAP pow-
ers, respectively.250 Both UDA(A)P Regulators can act to prohibit unfair or 
247. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 12.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Not all bank-affiliated lending models are likely to fall within the CFPB’s jurisdiction. See 
Slattery, supra note 195, at 264 (arguing that if a P2P lending platform “relied on another nondepository 
entity to issue the loan, the platform would likely qualify as service provider to that entity and still fall 
under the CFPB’s jurisdiction. If the platform relied on a depository institution that was not ‘very large’ 
to execute the loans, however, complications could arise. The CFPB would need to coordinate with the 
institution’s prudential regulator to ensure uniform application and enforcement of regulations.”
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deceptive acts or practices.251 In addition, the CFPB alone may prohibit abu-
sive acts or practices.252 The CFPB’s authority was modeled on the FTC’s 
authority and the CFPB draws on FTC guidance to help define unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices. The remainder of this section will examine the pro-
hibition on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices (in that order) and 
whether this prohibition enhances algorithmic lending’s promise or creates 
additional perils.
1. Preventing Unfair Acts or Practices
Version 2.0 algorithmic lenders may incur liability for engaging in un-
fair acts or practices.253 An unfair act or practice is one that “causes or is 
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoid-
able by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing bene-
fits to consumers or to competition.”254 In other words, there are three 
elements to establishing that an act or practice is unfair.255 Each element re-
quires “detailed, fact-specific analysis.”256 The purpose of prohibiting unfair 
acts or practices is “to protect consumer sovereignty by attacking practices 
that impede consumers’ ability to make informed choices.”257
While some commentators have suggested that the FTC could effec-
tively police Big Data users through its unfairness authority, it’s not clear 
that either UDA(A)P Regulator can effectively regulate algorithmic lenders 
251. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012); see also Hirsch, supra note 32, at 346; Slattery, supra note 195,
at 263 (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1002(6)(A)-(B), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)) (The CFPB “has broad authority to regulate participants in 
consumer financial transactions beyond existing consumer financial protection statutes” pursuant to its 
organic authority. Under its organic authority, it may regulate “‘any person that engages in offering or 
providing a consumer financial product or service’ or any affiliate of such a person.”).
252. 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2010).
253. On at least one occasion, the FTC has invoked its unfairness authority against an algorithmic 
lender “for basing credit reductions on an undisclosed behavioral scoring model that penalized consumers 
for using their credit cards for certain transactions, such as personal counseling.” Citron & Pasquale, 
supra note 136, at 23 (emphasis added); see also Kagan et al., supra note 151.
254. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2015). Others have described the test as requiring an injury that is: “(1) 
substantial, (2) without offsetting benefits, and (3) one that consumers cannot reasonably avoid.” J. How-
ard Beales, The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (May 30, 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2003/05/ftcs-use-unfairness-authority-
its-rise-fall-and-resurrection [https://perma.cc/K5LX-VHMN]; see also Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow 
Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014); Citron & 
Pasquale, supra note 136, at 23 (An “unfair” practice requires “conduct that substantially harms consum-
ers, or threatens to substantially harm consumers, which consumers cannot reasonably avoid, and where 
the harm outweighs the benefits.”).
255. Beales, supra note 254.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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in this fashion.258 To establish that an act of practice is unfair, a UDA(A)P 
Regulator must first prove that the algorithmic lender’s act or practice causes 
a substantial injury.259 Substantial injury means any sort of non-speculative 
and non-trivial harm.260 Professor Dennis D. Hirsch asserts that because al-
gorithmic lending can cause “diminished access to . . . loans” it imposes 
“damage that is neither speculative nor trivial,” thus constituting “substantial 
injuries” that “meet the first element of the Section 5 unfairness test.”261
Although it is clearly true that some people will suffer “diminished ac-
cess” to credit, this alone will not establish a substantial injury in every 
case.262 For example, assume that an algorithmic lender denies credit to a 
person with a FICO score of 550. This prospective borrower would almost 
surely be denied credit by a traditional lender as well.263 If “diminished ac-
cess” to credit is measured by comparing the decisions of algorithmic lenders 
to those of traditional lenders, our prospective borrower with a low FICO 
score is unlikely to be able to prove substantial injury because he or she is 
unlikely to have been approved for credit elsewhere.264 And there is a sound 
policy justification for adopting traditional lenders’ underwriting standards 
as the appropriate baseline; it could encourage algorithmic lenders to focus 
258. Hirsch, supra note 32, at 354 (arguing that the FTC’s unfairness authority provides “a regula-
tory mechanism . . . capable of weighing the costs and benefits of particular Big Data uses and deter-
mining, on balance, whether they are beneficial or harmful”).
259. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., UNFAIR ACTS & PRACTICES § 4.3.2.2 (2017) (“To be unfair 
under the FTC Act (and under the unfairness standard that the CFPB applies), an act or practice must 
cause or be ‘likely to cause’ substantial injury to consumers.”).
260. Hirsch, supra note 32, at 354 (“These injuries can consist of monetary, economic, health re-
lated, or other types of tangible harm. Injuries are ‘substantial’ where they are more than ‘trivial or 
speculative.’”); see also id.
261. Id.
262. Cf. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878, 913 (S.D. Ind. 
2015), appeal dismissed, No. 15-1761, 2016 WL 9447163 (7th Cir. Apr. 20, 2016) (finding that the CFPB 
had stated a claim under its unfairness authority where college steered its students toward loans with high 
interest and fees, after which approximately 64% of students defaulted, and where the college allegedly 
coerced its students into taking out these loans by rushing them through the student loan process and 
“employ[ing] intrusive and overbearing tactics”).
263. A borrower that is granted credit by a traditional lender but denied credit by an algorithmic 
lender may also suffer substantial injury, but is unlikely to be able to establish the algorithmic lender was 
engaged in an unfair act or practice because the injury would be reasonably avoidable (i.e. by borrowing 
from the traditional lender). But cf. id.
264. Alternatively, if algorithmic lending models are more predictive than traditional underwriting 
models, we ought to expect that algorithmic lenders will sometimes decline to lend to people who are not 
likely to repay their debts but who could get a loan from a traditional lender. If an algorithmic lender 
denies credit to someone who eventually defaults, has it truly harmed that person? In other words, it seems 
likely that some people are better off not borrowing.
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on expanding credit opportunities for sub-prime borrowers, which would 
seem to promote the promise of algorithmic lending.265
However, a court could decide that the appropriate baseline for com-
parison is not the underwriting standards of traditional lenders but to the hy-
pothetical lending standards of an algorithmic lender using unbiased data. In 
that case, a prospective borrower with a low algorithmic “credit score” but a 
high likelihood of repayment might successfully establish substantial injury 
if the algorithmic lender’s biased model fails to recognize the borrower’s 
high likelihood of repayment and the loan is denied. If courts adopt this base-
line, a plaintiff may be able to establish substantial injury. However, for rea-
sons discussed below, plaintiffs are likely to struggle to establish that their 
substantial injury was proximately caused by algorithmic lending bias.266
Consumers may be unable to reasonably avoid being substantially in-
jured by version 2.0 algorithmic lenders—the second unfairness element—
because of the opaque nature of some credit algorithms.267 Professor Hirsch 
asserts that consumer injury is not reasonably avoidable because few con-
sumers understand how algorithmic lending works and how to protect them-
selves.268 Hirsch is likely correct that some (or even many) consumers do not 
understand how algorithmic lending works and, therefore, how to protect 
themselves because many learning algorithms are thought to be quite 
opaque.269 That is, no one can explain to humans why some credit algorithms 
265. This does not accord with the practices of many version 2.0 algorithmic lenders, who have 
mostly targeted prime and near prime borrowers. See supra text accompanying notes 120–122.
266. See infra text accompanying notes 338–342 (discussing the thousands of data points consumers 
must review to understand whether inaccurate information is being used); supra text accompanying notes 
99–100 (discussing how learning algorithms mine data to determine the appropriate variables to consider 
when making decisions).
267. Cf. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 259, § 4.3.2.3.1 (noting that an injury is not rea-
sonably avoidable by a consumer “when the merchant’s sales practices unreasonably create or take ad-
vantage of an obstacle to the free exercise of consumer decision-making”).
268. Hirsch, supra note 32, at 355 (“Few consumers can become aware of and achieve control over 
the collection of their personal information. Fewer still can understand how companies use data analytics 
to infer additional information about them and make decisions that affect them. Consumers cannot protect 
themselves against Big Data’s privacy or discriminatory impacts through their market choices. These 
injuries meet the second Section 5 unfairness element.”); see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra 
note 259, §§ 4.3.2.3.1, 4.3.2.3.5 (citing authority for the proposition that “[i]njuries are not reasonably 
avoidable where a defendant exercises undue influence over a highly susceptible class of purchasers.”);
cf. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878, 913 (S.D. Ind. 2015), 
appeal dismissed, No. 15-1761, 2016 WL 9447163 (7th Cir. Apr. 20, 2016) (finding that student injury 
was not reasonably avoidable because the college essentially boxed the students in and prevented them 
from transferring). 
269. Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competen-
cies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 369 (2016) (explaining the problem of opacity as “the 
possibility that the inner workings of an AI system may be kept secret and may not be susceptible to 
reverse engineering”); cf. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d at 913.
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makes the decisions they do.270 For example, the CEO of Affirm, a new lend-
ing start-up from the founders of PayPal, recently admitted that he could not 
explain why the company makes particular loans.271 He said, “I wouldn’t 
know. Our math model says ‘OK. Probabilistically, [the borrower’s] good 
for the money.’”272 Presumably the reverse is also true, that the model indi-
cates that probabilistically, a prospective borrower is not “good for the 
money.”273 But this does not help a prospective borrower understand why 
their credit application was denied and how he or she might protect himself
or herself in the future.274
However, recent evidence suggests that opacity is not as inherent to 
learning algorithms as previously thought. As noted above, ZestFinance 
claims to have created a more transparent credit-scoring algorithm.275 If true, 
borrowers could take steps to protect themselves, making consumer injury 
reasonably avoidable and defeating an unfair act or practice claim.276 More-
over, for prospective borrowers who could obtain traditional forms of credit
but are denied credit by an algorithmic lender, that borrower could avoid 
injury by borrowing from the traditional lender.277
Both because ZestFinance claims to have achieved algorithmic trans-
parency, and also because of “a growing consensus among scholars” that 
270. Scherer, supra note 269, at 356–57 (expressing concern that outside observers “may not be able 
to detect potentially harmful features of an AI system”); see also Price II, supra note 99, at 16 
(“[M]achine-learning methods often leave the mechanisms in the resulting algorithms fully opaque; even 
when they are not, they are likely so complex as to defy understanding.”).
271. Pasquale, Mysteries, supra note 239; John Paul Titlow, With Affirm, PayPal Cofounder Has a 
New Way for You to Buy Things Without Credit Cards, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.fast-
company.com/3052796/paypal-co-founder-has-a-new-way-for-you-to-buy-things-in-stores 
[https://perma.cc/CXR8-ALNH]; see also WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 7 (describing Af-
firm as using “Big Data analytics to facilitate lending decisions for consumers financing the purchase of 
large household items such as furniture, appliances, or electronics”).
272. Pasquale, Mysteries, supra note 239.
273. Id. 
274. Slattery, supra note 195, at 269 (“[I]t is not clear that any entity could provide specific reasons 
for adverse credit decisions on P2P lending platforms”).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 242–246.
276. It appears that the first two elements of an unfair act or practice claim are in some tension. If 
algorithmic lenders don’t disclose much information about their algorithm, plaintiffs will have a hard 
time establishing that they have suffered a substantial injury. But if algorithmic lenders do disclose 
enough information for plaintiffs to suffer a substantial injury, it may also be true that they’ve provided
a roadmap for prospective borrowers to follow to improve their algorithmic “credit scores,” making the 
injury avoidable.
277. Unlike the students ITT Tech allegedly pressured into taking loans with onerous repayment 
terms, borrowers can and should shop around for consumer loans. Cf. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. ITT 
Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878, 913 (S.D. Ind. 2015), appeal dismissed, No. 15-1761, 2016 WL 
9447163 (7th Cir. Apr. 20, 2016).
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through transparency (i.e., access to source code, access to inputs, etc.), al-
gorithmic outputs can be adequately policed, I don’t think that Hirsch’s neg-
ative view is necessarily warranted.278 It may well be that algorithmic lenders 
can adequately explain the reasons they deny credit to borrowers. Or that the 
UDA(A)P Regulators’ invocation of their unfairness authority may incentiv-
ize other algorithmic lenders to design less opaque algorithms. Other possi-
bilities for creating algorithmic transparency—if technically feasible279—
include legislative mandates or indirect incentives, such as “tax incentives or 
tort standards that limit the liability of companies that make their AI systems 
more transparent.”280
Finally, the effectiveness of algorithmic lending models in reducing 
costs and increasing credit access, thereby benefiting both prospective bor-
rowers and the lending market, remains to be seen. The third requirement to 
prove that an act or practice is unfair is that the injury not be “outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”281 In other words, a 
UDA(A)P Regulator must generally balance “the costs that the activity im-
poses on consumers against the benefits it creates for consumers and for 
business.”282 As Professor Hirsch notes, it’s hard to know how this factor 
comes out.283 On the one hand, algorithmic lending models can decrease 
costs, creating competition with traditional lenders and—in a competitive 
market—benefitting consumers.284 It can also increase credit access, which 
278. See, e.g., Tutt, supra note 20, at 110 (“There appears to be a growing consensus among scholars 
that the ability to require transparency should be one of the first tools used to regulate algorithmic safety. 
Transparency can take many forms and can range from feather-light to brick-heavy.”).
279. “[O]ur inability to understand, explain, or predict algorithmic errors is not only unsurprising, 
but destined to become commonplace.” Tutt, supra note 20, at 89–90 (discussing errors made by IBM’s 
Watson and Tesla’s self-driving car, and explaining that “[n]o one knows precisely why these algorithms 
failed as they did and, in the Tesla case, it is not entirely clear the algorithms failed at all”); see also 
Andrew Fogg, Artificial Intelligence Regulation: Let’s Not Regulate Mathematics!, IMPORT,
https://www.import.io/post/artificial-intelligence-regulation-lets-not-regulate-mathematics/ 
[https://perma.cc/8R9A-AHDE] (arguing three points, including that (i) explaining an AI system’s 
choices “is impossible to achieve, so it should not be legislated,” (ii) “attempting to extract an explanation 
out of a modern Deep Learning model is bound to fail,” and (iii) due to the sheer volume of data inputs, 
a learning algorithm’s output “is utterly impossible to explain in one sentence. Or a paragraph. Or a 1000-
page book. We can’t explain a really complex mathematical function learned from a mountain of data in 
a way that will satisfy a human. This is what we are facing. Legislating the need for an explanation will 
not make that contradiction disappear.”)
280. Scherer, supra note 269, at 374.
281. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012); see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 259, § 4.3.2.4.
282. Hirsch, supra note 32, at 355.
283. Id. at 355–57.
284. It’s not clear that this market is sufficiently competitive that cost savings will be passed along 
to consumers. Cf. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Infor-
mation Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 530 (2006) (discussing price shrouding 
in the credit card markets).
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is critically important for participating in our modern economy. On the other 
hand, “dumb” algorithms and poorly designed or trained learning algorithms 
can disparately impact some of the most vulnerable members of our society. 
Even if algorithmic lenders increase credit access for some, if they do so at 
the cost of greater inequality in credit access, it’s hard to evaluate how a 
UDA(A)P Regulator would balance access and equity. This is likely to be 
deeply fact-dependent.
2. Deceptive Acts or Practices
The UDA(A)P Regulators’ deceptiveness authority is unlikely to play 
a significant role in promoting the promise of algorithmic lending. A brief 
review of recent regulatory activity may be illuminating. In one of the 
CFPB’s first enforcement actions against a fintech company, the CFPB al-
leged that “Dwolla Inc., a prominent online payment provider, . . . allegedly 
misrepresent[ed] its data security practices as ‘safe,’ ‘secure,’ ‘safer [than 
credit cards],’ and ‘exceeding industry standards.’”285 In a 2008 FTC en-
forcement action against CompuCredit, the FTC alleged the company had 
deceived consumers “by failing to disclose that consumers’ credit lines 
would be reduced if they used their credit cards for cash advances or for
certain types of transactions, including marriage counseling, or at bars and 
nightclubs.”286 The FTC has also pursued “companies for collecting more 
data—like a consumer’s online search history—than was disclosed to con-
sumers in the company’s privacy policies.”287
These enforcement actions suggest that UDA(A)P Regulators generally 
use their deceptiveness authority to ensure that any representations made to 
consumers are consistent with the lender’s actual product or business 
model.288 This is unlikely to increase the predictive accuracy of credit-scor-
ing algorithms, will certainly not decrease costs, nor remove human bias 
285. Lazarev, supra note 69.
286. See also Kagan et al., supra note 151.
287. Tunstall & Caplan, supra note 74 (“For instance, the FTC brought an enforcement action in-
volving an online advertising network, Epic Marketplace Inc., when the company apparently disclosed in 
its privacy policy that it would collect information about consumers’ visits to websites within the com-
pany’s network. The FTC complaint alleges, however, that Epic actually collected data about all sites 
consumers visited — even those outside of Epic’s network. The result: the FTC barred Epic from what it 
deemed a UDAP, and required the company to destroy all data collected by it.” (citing In re Matter of 
Epic Marketplace Inc., F.T.C. No. 112-3182, 2012 WL 6188553 (Dec. 5, 2012))).
288. Prentiss Cox, The Importance of Deceptive Practice Enforcement in Financial Institution Reg-
ulation, 30 PACE L. REV. 279, 287 (2009).
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from the credit-scoring process.289 But it does empower UDA(A)P Regula-
tors to curtail predatory lending practices by algorithmic lenders, should they 
engage in such practices.290 Predatory lending is a practice that algorithmic 
lending could facilitate and therefore it’s important to adequately police it.
3. Abusive Acts or Practices
Finally, version 2.0 algorithmic lenders may be subject to liability for 
engaging in abusive acts or practices. The CFPB (but not the FTC) has the 
authority to proscribe and prosecute abusive acts or practices, which are 
those that interfere with a consumer’s ability “to understand a term or con-
dition of a consumer financial product or service.”291 The CFPB’s abusive 
authority also protects against acts or practices that take “unreasonable ad-
vantage of: (A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the 
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service; (B) the inability 
of the consumer to protect his or her interests when selecting or using a con-
sumer financial product or service; or (C) the reasonable reliance by the con-
sumer on a covered person to act in the interests of the consumer.”292
Abusiveness claims appear to contain “an element of alleged surprise or in-
ability of consumers to understand credit features or contractual rights due 
to the Covered Person’s alleged inadequate disclosures.”293 The CFPB vir-
tually always asserts its “abusive” authority alongside claims of an unfair or 
deceptive act or practice. Essentially, the CFPB’s “abusive” power has 
lacked its own independent bite, with Adam Levitin describing it as “the dog 
that didn’t bark.”294
289. To avoid liability for deception, such lenders need only avoid misleading consumers by omit-
ting key information or through active misrepresentations. Kagan et al., supra note 151.
290. Jackson, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing how data brokers might use Big Data to prey on certain 
consumers).
291. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)(1) (2011). Being limited to “consumer financial products or services” 
means that this authority does not extend to small business products or services.
292. Id. § 5531(d)(2).
293. Donald C. Lampe et al., MORRISON FOERSTER, THE CFPB & UDAAP: A “KNOW IT WHEN 
YOU SEE IT” STANDARD? 2015 MID-YEAR UPDATE 5 (2015), https://media2.mofo.com/docu-
ments/150727cfpbudaap.pdf [https://perma.cc/M92F-JXBP].
294. Adam Levitin, Dodd-Frank’s “Abusive” Standard: The Dog That Didn’t Bark, CREDIT SLIPS
(June 20, 2017, 11:40 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/06/abusive-the-dog-that-didnt-
bark.html#more [https://perma.cc/P79L-GFDN] (noting that “the CFPB has been very sparing in alleging 
that acts and practices are ‘abusive’. The CFPB has brought around 185 enforcement actions to date. Only 
22 of these (less than 12% of all enforcement actions) have included counts alleging ‘abusive’ acts and 
practices. In all but one instance in these 22 cases, the very same behavior alleged to be ‘abusive’ was 
also alleged to be ‘unfair’ and/or ‘deceptive.’”).
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Despite their novelty in some ways, algorithmic lenders offer somewhat 
plain vanilla loan products that generally mirror what’s available from tradi-
tional lenders. As such, they do not seem to be at an increased risk (relative 
to traditional lenders) of misleading consumers as to the risks, costs, or con-
ditions of their products or services.295 To the extent they are, however, 
greater transparency by algorithmic lenders would appear to mitigate some 
of this risk. But, to the extent that algorithmic lenders use their credit-scoring 
models to engage in predatory lending practices,296 the CFPB should use its 
“abusiveness” authority to curtail those practices.
In summary, UDA(A)P Regulators may be able to push algorithmic 
lenders towards greater transparency through the selective use of their 
UDA(A)P authority. And they should be able to prohibit predatory lending 
with these powers. I would be concerned, however, about using either the 
UDA(A)P Regulators’ unfairness or abusive authority to punish algorithmic 
lenders for using somewhat opaque credit-scoring algorithms absent clear 
consumer injury. Algorithmic lenders appear to be moving to create more 
transparent credit-scoring algorithms and UDA(A)P Regulators should en-
courage this trend. They should use the flexibility built into the UDA(A)P 
standards to enjoin novel forms of bad business practices while allowing al-
gorithmic lenders the time to iterate and improve.297
C. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
To the extent that it applies, the FCRA may present major challenges to 
version 2.0 algorithmic lenders because it was designed without algorithmic 
lending practices in mind. The FCRA “is the nation’s oldest financial privacy 
statute.”298 It was crafted in the late 1960s and enacted in 1970 to promote 
“the accuracy, fairness, and privacy of information in the files of consumer 
reporting agencies.”299
295. Nicholas Smyth, Attempting to Ascertain CFPB’s Theory Of ‘Abusive’ Acts, LAW360 (June 10, 
2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/664281/attempting-to-ascertain-cfpb-s-theory-of-abusive-acts 
[https://perma.cc/9GZH-7KBE] (suggesting that the CFPB is unlikely to invoke its “abusiveness” power 
unless consumer choice is absent or where the products offered are unduly complex).
296. Jackson, supra note 2, at 22.
297. James J. Pulliam, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Market Competitors, UDAP Consumer Protection 
Laws, and the U.S. Mortgage Crisis, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1251, 1296 (2010) (“These advantages are
particularly pertinent in the context of the flexible UDAP unfairness standard because an effective advo-
cate can further a UDAP’s statutory purpose of adapting to and enjoining novel forms of bad business 
practices.”).
298. Tunstall & Caplan, supra note 74.
299. A Summary of Your Rights Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0096-fair-credit-reporting-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/423P-
PMW6].
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In general, the FCRA applies to those companies that are compiling and 
selling “consumer information for use in credit, employment, housing, or 
other similar decisions.”300 To be more precise, and to determine whether the 
FCRA applies to algorithmic lenders, one must turn to the definition of con-
sumer reporting agency (“CRA”), which is:
any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit 
basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling 
or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on con-
sumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports301 to third parties, 
and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the pur-
pose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.302
This definition clearly includes the big three credit bureaus, Experian, 
Equifax, and TransUnion. But, it also applies to many other entities, which 
may include “creditors, data brokers, employment screening companies, 
check approval companies, alternative credit bureaus,” and, most im-
portantly, some algorithmic lenders.303
Bank-affiliated algorithmic lenders must comply with FCRA require-
ments, but direct lenders are unlikely to be covered by the FCRA because 
they make loans directly to consumers.304 As such, direct lenders assemble 
and evaluate information about potential borrowers for their own use rather 
than to furnish to third parties.305 By contrast, the FCRA likely applies to 
most bank-affiliated algorithmic lenders because they generally assemble 
300. Freeman, Jr. et al., supra note 19.
301. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2015) (defining a “consumer report” as: “any written, oral, or other 
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit wor-
thiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode 
of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving 
as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for — (A) credit or insurance to be used primarily 
for personal, family, or household purposes; (B) employment purposes; or (C) any other purpose author-
ized under section 1681b [relating to permissible purposes for pulling credit].”); see also NCLC, BIG
DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22, at 22 (noting that “a wide variety of information about a consumer 
satisfies this part of the definition of a consumer report, including most of the information collected by 
Big Data brokers”).
302. 15 U.S.C. § 1681f.
303. NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22, at 21.
304. TREASURY, supra note 197.
305. Freeman, Jr. et al., supra note 19 (“Because the FCRA does not generally apply where lenders 
use internally generated data in making credit decisions, lenders relying on their own Big Data for credit 
determinations may believe that they are exempt from FCRA requirements.”).
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and evaluate credit information on prospective borrowers to aid their affili-
ated bank in loaning money to consumers.306 Where affiliated banks are pay-
ing algorithmic lenders to assemble and evaluate consumer credit 
information, the FCRA will apply.307 The FTC has also taken this view.308
Where the FCRA applies, it imposes at least four obligations on CRAs 
that are relevant to algorithmic lenders. First, CRAs must “follow reasonable 
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” of their consumer re-
ports.309 Second, CRAs must put in place procedures that “allow consumers 
to know what is in their consumer reports.”310 Third, CRAs must allow con-
sumers “to dispute incorrect or inaccurate information.”311 And, finally, any 
lender that makes “adverse credit determinations (either denial or increased 
costs)” based on information in a consumer report “must also provide notice 
to the consumer of the lenders’ use of the consumer report information.”312
Each obligation will be addressed in turn, except for the fourth one, which 
was discussed previously in the context of the ECOA.313
The first obligation that version 2.0 algorithmic lenders must comply 
with—the FCRA’s accuracy requirement—may be technically difficult to 
306. This difference—that bank-affiliated but not direct lenders face FCRA compliance issues—
may encourage banks to purchase rather than partner with fintech companies to avoid FCRA liability.
307. However, the FCRA may not apply if a court or regulator determines that the algorithmic lender 
is the “true lender,” which would make them much more like a direct lender. Cf. Sobers, supra note 131
(discussing the true lender doctrine and reviewing cases).
308. Freeman, Jr. et al., supra note 19 (“Where a lender allows an unaffiliated entity access to the 
company’s own data to assist in making credit determinations, this act may trigger FCRA implications. 
As stated in the Report, the FTC will likely view third parties offering analytical services performed on 
the company’s own data as meeting the definition of being a CRA under FCRA. Not only does this create 
legal obligations for the unaffiliated entity with respect to the data, but it also triggers lender-specific 
notice requirements in the event of adverse credit decisions that would not otherwise exist had the data 
analysis been kept in-house.”).
309. 15 U.S.C § 1681e(b) (2015); see also Freeman, Jr. et al., supra note 19 (CRAs have “legal 
duties regarding ensuring the accuracy of consumer reports, providing consumers access to their infor-
mation, and” correcting errors.)
310. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a); see also Roberts, supra note 86 (The FCRA “requires credit-rating ser-
vices to disclose the contents of a consumer’s file to the consumer and to provide for the consumer to 
challenge entries in the file.”); NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22, at 24 (finding that Big Data 
brokers typically failed “to comply with the requirement to disclose all information in the consumer’s 
file”).
311. Tunstall & Caplan, supra note 74; Roberts, supra note 86; see also NCLC, BIG
DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22.
312. Freeman, Jr. et al., supra note 19 (“If, for instance, the lender provides customer-specific infor-
mation to obtain input on a credit decision, the lender will likely be obligated to provide mandatory notice 
to the consumer in the event of an adverse decision. If, on the other hand, the lender uses aggregate 
information to develop general lending guidelines, and based on these guidelines a consumer is denied 
credit, the lender will be required to disclose the nature of the aggregate information if the lender receives 
a specific request from the consumer.”).
313. See supra text accompanying notes 232–249.
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satisfy because of the sheer volume of data points version 2.0 algorithmic 
lenders process.314 CRAs need to put in place reasonable steps to ensure the 
maximum possible accuracy of their credit reports.315 Even though tradi-
tional lenders only need to ensure the accuracy of a relatively finite set of 
data points, more than twenty percent of traditional credit reports have ma-
terial errors.316 And approximately seventy percent of disputes over errors 
on credit reports leave consumers believing that inaccurate information re-
mains on their credit reports.317 By contrast, algorithmic lenders need to en-
sure the accuracy of thousands or even tens of thousands of data points. This 
may lead to an explosion of errors. With so many additional data points, it’s 
no surprise that a survey by the NCLC found that “the Big Data companies’ 
reports showed a remarkable level of inaccuracy.”318 That algorithmic lend-
ers have inaccuracies in their credit reports is no surprise. But it’s not clear 
from this report whether algorithmic lenders’ consumer credit reports paint 
a picture of prospective borrowers that is, in the aggregate, less accurate than 
traditional credit reports, or whether these inaccuracies are actionable.
Liability for algorithmic lenders is uncertain because, among other 
things, it’s possible that algorithmic lenders do make use of some inaccurate 
data points but that the total picture provided by algorithmic credit reports 
are more accurate than traditional credit reports because it creates a “data 
mosaic.”319 By “cross-referencing a wide range of data points drawn from 
public records, online habits, spending histories, and more,” algorithmic 
lenders may be able to “produce insights that are more valuable than the sum 
314. NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22, at 23 (discussing reasons why the “accuracy re-
quirement” presents a challenging compliance issue for “many Big Data brokers”).
315. 15 U.S.C § 1681e(b).
316. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, In FTC Study, Five Percent of Consumers Had Errors 
on their Credit Reports that Could Result in Less Favorable Terms for Loans (Feb. 11, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/02/ftc-study-five-percent-consumers-had-errors-
their-credit-reports [https://perma.cc/54RK-HMNK] [hereinafter Press Release, Five Percent]; see also
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Issues Follow-Up Study on Credit Report Accuracy (Jan. 21, 
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/01/ftc-issues-follow-study-credit-report-
accuracy [https://perma.cc/M2MT-KKTC] [hereinafter Press Release, Follow-Up] (reporting that “one 
in five consumers had an error that was corrected by a credit reporting agency (CRA) after it was disputed 
on at least one of their three credit reports”); ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 38 (7th ed. 2014) (noting that “[a] 2004 study by the Public 
Interest Research Group found that 79% of credit reports contained errors, and that 25% contained errors 
big enough to change the person’s credit scores”).
317. Press Release, Five Percent, supra note 316; see also Press Release, Follow-Up, supra note 316
(“However, 84 of these consumers (nearly 70 percent) continue to believe that at least some of the dis-
puted information is inaccurate.”).
318. NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22, at 23.
319. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 7. No court has evaluated this argument yet.
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of their parts.”320 In other words, despite some inaccuracies, “Big Data mo-
saics” may be able to better “identify meaningful patterns and predict future 
behavior on a granular level” than traditional lending models.321 In short, 
some assert that “[c]ombining massive data sets thoughtfully can lead to 
greater accuracy and granularity,” meaning that consumers get better prod-
ucts offered more efficiently.322 As such, while algorithmic lenders may rely 
on more inaccurate data points, they may still see a more accurate represen-
tation of consumers propensity to repay their debts.
Moreover, algorithmic lenders may have not yet fully explored the host 
of ways by which they might improve their data’s accuracy. One possibility
is for algorithmic lenders to use fewer data points gathered from questionable 
sources and more data points to which they are expressly granted access. For 
example, consumers might voluntarily share personal data in exchange for 
better credit offers. Consumers already voluntarily share enormous amounts 
of personal information in exchange for “free” email, web search, and access 
to social networks, among other things. Data obtained through consumer 
consent is likely to be better quality (i.e. more accurate and reliable),323 thus 
presenting fewer compliance risks for algorithmic lenders.324
Another alternative for improving data accuracy is used by the data an-
alytics firm, Acxiom. Acxiom is not an algorithmic lender, but it does collect 
the same sort of data that algorithmic lenders may use in making credit de-
terminations.325 Acxiom invites people to participate in improving the accu-
racy of its data by making its data publicly available.326 Members of the 
320. Id. 
321. Id. at 7, 8, and 23 (“By comparing identical or similar data from multiple sources, analytics 
companies can identify data points, or even whole data sets, that appear to be outliers that should not be 
trusted.”); Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 108.
322. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 9. 
323. One concern about Big Data is that it is often linked to a consumer by only the consumer’s 
name. Consumers could effectively verify that data by granting algorithmic lenders access to their ac-
counts. 
324. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 6 (noting that “[o]ne effective strategy” for reducing 
compliance risk by increasing data accuracy “is to invite consumers to opt in and voluntarily share more 
personal information and financial data in exchange for more attractive offers and lower rates. Products 
that allow consumers to control the balance of trade-offs between greater privacy and greater value can 
allow both customers and providers to reap greater benefits.”).
325. Id. at 12.
326. Mary Beth Quirk, Data Broker Acxiom’s New Site Allows Users to View and Edit the Marketing
Info It’s Collected, CONSUMERIST (Sept. 4, 2013), https://consumerist.com/2013/09/04/data-broker-
acxioms-new-site-allows-users-to-view-and-edit-the-marketing-info-its-collected 
[https://perma.cc/8GBK-3AEJ].
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public are invited “to search for their names and profiles on a public inter-
face, and update or correct information that is outmoded or shows errors.”327
In other words, “Acxiom encourages consumers to be partners in cleaning 
its data files.”328 Early reports suggest that many data elements in “Big Data” 
files are inaccurate, but Acxiom’s pilot program “provides a clear avenue for 
consumers concerned about their financial profiles to scrub problematic data 
points and participate in enhancing its efficacy.”329
These possible ways to improve data accuracy notwithstanding, algo-
rithmic lenders may be violating the FCRA because the practical effects of 
data inaccuracies in algorithmic lending models are yet to be determined. As 
such, the FTC and CFPB330 may be able to use the FCRA’s accuracy require-
ment to push algorithmic lenders to construct better credit-scoring models, 
which should make credit more accessible and more affordable for those who 
are likely to repay their debts.331 Whether these inaccuracies are likely to 
lead to unlawful discrimination and therefore whether the FCRA will reduce 
the perilous aspects of algorithmic lending is uncertain. Currently, regulators 
appear to be taking a hands-off approach, allowing these companies to ex-
periment with their new lending models.
The second relevant obligation imposed by the FCRA—that CRAs 
must, upon request, disclose the contents of a consumer’s credit report to that 
consumer—may also be problematic for version 2.0 algorithmic lenders due 
to data volume and transparency issues.332 The NCLC has asserted that Big 
Data brokers typically failed to comply with this requirement.333 The FTC 
has also expressed concern that algorithmic lenders may be violating fair 
lending laws by making lending decisions based on inaccurate data “without 
affording borrowers the opportunity to correct inaccurate information.”334
But even if algorithmic lenders did provide its data sources to consumers, 
there may be no reasonable way for a consumer to review their credit files.335
327. WOLKOWITZ & PARKER, supra note 18, at 12.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. To the extent that the true lender is a depository institution, a regulator such as the OCC would 
be the relevant regulator. 
331. See Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 108.
332. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) (2015) (explaining the disclosure requirement and its limits).
333. See NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22.
334. Trudel et al., supra note 71.
335. “[I]t may prove practically impossible for consumers, when dealing with big-data scoring sys-
tems that potentially integrate thousands of variables, to verify the accuracy of their scores and reports or 
to challenge decisions based on alternative models.” Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 24, at 189–90.
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The sheer number of variables might be overwhelming.336 In addition, it’s 
not clear that most learning algorithms are yet sufficiently transparent to ex-
plain to consumers the basis for the adverse determination (despite a legal 
requirement to do so).337
Similarly, the FCRA’s accuracy and disclosure requirements may be 
outdated and ineffective given the increasing complexity of algorithmic 
lending. Although CRAs must take reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy 
of credit reports,338 the FCRA puts the onus on consumers to review their 
credit files and dispute inaccurate items.339 And even though traditional lend-
ing decisions are made using far less complex models than those used by 
algorithmic lenders, there’s “a high incidence of inaccuracies in traditional 
credit reports, leading to elevated rates of interest for certain borrowers.”340
To establish harm with an algorithmic credit report, a consumer would have 
to review the thousands of data points used by the algorithmic lender to iden-
tify an error, and “prove that the error resulted in a faulty score.”341 The pro-
cess by which thousands of data points are converted into a credit 
determination “is so complex that even the most sophisticated consumer 
would likely find it difficult to understand, or to determine whether any in-
accuracies in the raw data negatively influenced her final score.”342 This 
complexity may render many of the protections available under the FCRA 
336. Id. at 164–67.
337. Roberts, supra note 86 (noting that the FCRA “really puts a tremendous degree of emphasis on 
institutions to understand exactly how their model is working” (quoting Kevin Petrasic)).
338. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 24, at 188 (“CRAs must also use reasonable procedures to guar-
antee the accuracy of information in consumer reports. Not only must the information in a report be 
literally true, it also must not be misleading or incomplete.”).
339. “Existing laws like the FCRA establish basic accuracy requirements for the data used in credit-
assessment tools, however consumers bear the burden of identifying and disputing inaccuracies.” Id. at 
198 (“FCRA’s accuracy requirements appear to offer inadequate incentives to increase data accuracy, 
even in the conventional credit-scoring context where scorers are dealing with fewer types and sources 
of data.”).
340. Id. at 178.
341. Id. at 179.
342. Id. at 182 (“[T]he manner in which the data scientist develops and refines the final creditscoring 
model can potentially create major barriers to transparency and to consumers’ ability to challenge scores. 
The process of data transformation, metavariable development, feature selection, and, finally, the filtering 
of significant features through multiple models is so complex . . . .”); see also Gordon & Stewart, supra
note 22 (“These include concerns about data quality and difficulty correcting inaccuracies, including con-
sumers’ potential inability to understand complex modeling techniques. The bureau is also concerned that 
unlike traditional credit factors, which are heavily influenced by the consumer’s own conduct, alternative 
data that relate to peers or broader consumer segments may limit consumers’ ability to improve their 
credit rating.”).
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more illusory than real.343 It’s unclear if this is a compliance issue that algo-
rithmic lenders will have to deal with, but it once again highlights the need 
to update the FCRA to reflect that new lending models exist.
The FCRA, the ECOA and the FTC’s Section 5 authority were all de-
signed before algorithmic lenders existed. And the CFPB was just getting set 
up around the same time as the first algorithmic lenders were populating their 
first spreadsheets. Unsurprisingly, therefore, these laws did not anticipate the 
new algorithmic lending models.344 As a result, regulating algorithmic lend-
ers under the current legal regime is a bit like trying to fit a round peg into a 
square hole.345 The two largest algorithmic lenders—Prosper and Lending 
Club—have admitted as much.346 Both noted in their prospectuses that: “We 
may not always have been, and may not always be, in compliance with these 
[consumer financial protection] laws.”347 Simply put, the novelty of these 
new lending models means that the FTC and CFPB have not yet tested their 
compliance with the nation’s federal consumer financial protection laws. But 
our state and federal regulators must ensure that these entities do more than 
simply enrich their shareholders. Our consumer financial protection regula-
tors should seek to increase credit access for those that are reasonably likely 
to repay their debts, while preventing the worst abuses and types of predation 
that can exist.348
CONCLUSION
Our consumer financial protection laws are outdated. Some have argued 
that society has reached an inflection point and the pace of financial services 
343. NCLC, BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, supra note 22, at 24 (“However, even if data brokers were to 
provide this disclosure, the information may not be comprehensible for consumers due to its sheer vol-
ume. Therefore, meaningful disclosure may not be possible when using Big Data. This may prove to be 
a fundamental flaw with using Big Data for determining eligibility for credit or other FCRA-covered 
purposes.”).
344. Cf. Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation, in MARK FENWICK ET AL.,
PERSPECTIVES IN LAW, BUSINESS & INNOVATION (forthcoming) (manuscript at 9–10), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2831040 [https://perma.cc/ZC3W-3GWV].
345. Slattery, supra note 195.
346. Collectively, these two enterprises have approximately 80% of the current market. See USPIRG 
& CDD, supra note 75 (asserting that, as of 2015, Lending Club and Prosper were dominating the market 
for unsecured consumer loans issued by marketplace lenders).
347. Slattery, supra note 195, at 265 n.320 (citing Lending Club, Prospectus for Registration State-
ment No. 333-151827, at 26 (June 6, 2011); Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Prospectus for Registration State-
ment No. 333-14701, at 25 (May 17, 2011)).
348. Cf. id. at 265 (“The CFPB can and should resolve these uncertainties to facilitate innovation, 
market entry, and compliance, particularly with regard to the Truth in Lending Act, Equal Credit Oppor-
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lenders so the CFPB can gather insights on how to best promote the promise 
of algorithmic lending while preventing harmful credit discrimination.358
And the CFPB may be well-suited to ensuring that algorithmic lenders 
do not systematically disadvantage society’s most vulnerable populations.359
The CFPB was specifically designed “to make difficult tradeoffs between 
innovation and safety in a fast-paced industry.”360 As a result, it already has 
the relevant components in place to encourage lenders to develop discrimi-
nation-conscious algorithmic design. “It has a research unit focused on ‘mar-
ket areas of alternative consumer financial products or services with high 
growth rates’ and ‘access to fair and affordable credit for traditionally un-
derserved communities.’”361 It has supervisory authority over many non-
bank financial institutions by which it can learn more about innovative algo-
rithmic lenders.362 And it “has highly flexible powers to issue rules prevent-
ing financial service providers from ‘committing or engaging in an unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive act.’”363 In short, the CFPB can be an “alert, potent, 
and responsive regulator” for algorithmic lenders that repairs the existing 
(but flawed) regulatory regime and ferrets out and remedies new problems 
as they emerge.364 An actively engaged CFPB will encourage algorithmic 
lenders—who often hire professionals “from significantly less heavily reg-
ulated industries”—to invest in educating their workers and empowering 
their compliance departments.365
Algorithmic lending has the potential to “effectively reduce discrimina-
tion and promote fairness and opportunity, including expanding access to 
credit in low-income communities.”366 Any discussion about the potential 
358. This might also help overcome the problem that some scholars have noted, which is that many 
algorithmic lending models involve proprietary elements. See, e.g., Tutt, supra note 20, at 107.
359. The CFPB’s primary purpose is consumer protection See Slattery, supra note 195, at 271–272.
360. Tutt, supra note 20, at 118.
361. Slattery, supra note 195, at 272.




365. Freeman, Jr. et al., supra note 19. Of course, this requires an active and engaged CFPB and the 
Trump administration has seemed generally hostile to the bureau. See Paul Barrett, The Head of the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau Isn’t Going Down Without a Fight, BLOOMBERG (July 20, 2017,
10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-20/the-head-of-the-consumer-financial-
protection-bureau-isn-t-going-down-without-a-fight [http://perma.cc/NBW9-AYJU] (discussing “un-
ceasing hostility from the Trump administration, Congressional Republicans, and the business lobby” 
faced by former CFPB head, Richard Cordray).
366. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 353, at 30.
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threats of algorithmic lending must consider how algorithmic lending com-
pares to the status quo.367 And the status quo is generally not good. Regula-
tors have demonstrated their willingness to allow algorithmic lenders to try 
to improve upon the status quo by, for example, providing algorithmic lend-
ers, such as Upstart, a “no action letter.”368 Such letters are issued as “part of 
the CFPB’s ‘Project Catalyst’ – an effort to encourage innovation by reduc-
ing what many see as substantial regulatory uncertainty facing the financial
services industry today.”369 No action letters provide some solace to innova-
tive financial service providers, such as version 2.0 algorithmic lenders, by 
confirming that the CFPB “‘has no present intention to recommend initiation 
of an enforcement or supervisory action against the requester with respect 
to’ that product.”370
Algorithmic lending 2.0 is not a panacea. Some consumers are likely to 
be worse off because of algorithmic lenders’ use of Big Data.371 And we 
must be attentive to the potential for algorithmic lenders to harm the most 
vulnerable in our society. But we should continue to generally take a wait 
and see approach before strictly regulating version 2.0 algorithmic lenders 
because they may represent an improvement over the traditional approach,
which has not protected our society’s most vulnerable.
Finally, to the extent that algorithmic lending 2.0 maintains the status 
quo of unequal credit access, it may merely be highlighting structural ine-
qualities in contemporary American society. These structural inequalities 
may be best remedied through a much more radical solution than strictly 
regulating algorithmic lenders. Such solutions might include reparations to 
367. Id.
368. Willis, supra note 119. In addition, one of the first major steps the CFPB took to address issues 
with algorithmic lenders was simply to accept complaints in its consumer complaint database about al-
gorithmic lenders. See CFPB Now Accepting Complaints on Consumer Loans from Online Marketplace 
Lender, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-now-accepting-complaints-on-consumer-loans-from-online-marketplace-lender/ 
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try to repair the racial wealth and income gaps,372 or a universal basic in-
come.373 Both are interesting ideas deserving of far greater attention than this 
Article has the space to devote.
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